SPECIAL REPORT 4
BROKING BAD The BIG mAN Of CeDAR fAlls
he was starting up a business and needed
space,” said barber Ron Welper, who owned
Hair Unlimited on Main Street. Wasendorf
moved in a couple of desks, a computer and
a phone, and got to work contacting would-
be clients. A year or so later, he moved out
and up.
Wasendorf bought a small brokerage,
Dana Futures of Iowa, in 1985. As an “in-
troducing broker,” he was responsible for
rustling up business, helping arrange com-
modity-futures trades by farmers or small-
scale speculators. Futures allow a seller or
buyer to lock in a price for, say, soybeans at
an agreed future date. Wasendorf would pass
along those trades to futures commission
merchants – the regulated middlemen re-
sponsible for executing deals on exchanges.
e business was launched as many
farmers were looking to protect their op-
erations amid plummeting corn prices and
a sharp downturn in the farm economy.
Wasendorf later bragged on his company’s
website that he made his customers rich by
anticipating the 1987 stock-market crash
and advising them to sell ahead of it.
By the early 1990s, he began moving
sta to oces on LaSalle Street, a block
from the Chicago Board of Trade, center
of agricultural futures trading for 150 years.
Soon, Wasendorf moved upmarket to bro-
ker his clients’ trades as a futures-commis-
sion merchant, collecting fees and earning
interest on their collateral. He opened Per-
egrine Financial Group in 1992. e com-
pany became commonly known as PFG, or
PFGBest.
e rm, with oces in Cedar Falls and
Chicago, had just $2 million in customer
funds for its rst few years. Yet the fraud
commenced soon after PFG Best opened,
according to Wasendorf ’s confession letter.
In the winter of 1993, after a routine au-
dit, a Commodity Futures Trading Com-
mission investigator named Robert Agnew
began inquiring into a possible violation of
rules on how Peregrine was investing cus-
tomer money – something that took Wasen-
dorf by surprise, he wrote in his letter.
What specically caught Agnew’s at-
tention isn’t known. Agnew could not be
reached for comment. A CFTC spokes-
man declined to comment.
Wasendorf said Agnew gave him a copy
of the rules Peregrine was allegedly violat-
ing; the broker replied by saying the rules
were outdated, making the investigator
“livid,” according to the letter.
Agnew and his team then “harassed”
Wasendorf, conducting six audits over ve
months until the agency found a “techni-
cal violation” that forced Peregrine to raise
more capital.
CHEATING FATE
Legal fees mounted, according to his con-
fession letter, and the need to keep more
cash on hand sparked nancial trouble.
“I had no access to additional capital
and I was forced into a dicult decision:
Should I go out of business or cheat?” the
letter states. “I guess my ego was too big to
admit failure. So I cheated, I falsied the
very core of the nancial documents of
PFG, the Bank Statements.”
Peregrine got a big break in 1995. Regu-
lators at the National Futures Association
found that managers had used bad checks
to falsely bulk up capital at brokerage First
Commercial Financial Group. e NFA
forced First Commercial to move its cus-
tomers to other rms with a history of
working with small independent brokers.
It was a common move: help clients of a
troubled brokerage quickly resume trading
by simply shifting their accounts to a simi-
lar shop.
Peregrine was one of at least two rms
entrusted with the clients. It kept some of
First Commercial’s brokers, too. But trou-
ble followed. In 1996, the NFA ned these
brokers and Peregrine for using “false and
deceptive” promotional material.
e NFA also discovered that Per-
egrine failed to properly calculate how
much money was in its customer accounts
and to keep them properly segregated. e
brokerage settled the matter by paying a
$75,000 ne without admitting or deny-
ing the allegations.
It was a pattern that Peregrine would
follow at least twice more: take over a trou-
bled rm that the NFA later penalized for
lax oversight.
e NFA declined to comment on why
it did not consider such acquisitions and
violations to be a possible red ag.
By the late 1990s, Peregrine was a fam-
ily aair. Connie worked in the personnel
department. Russ Jr. graduated from the
University of Iowa with a nance degree,
studied Spanish and worked as a liaison
between the Chicago Mercantile Exchange
and regulators in Mexico over the devel-
opment of Mexican peso futures. en, in
1998, he joined Peregrine as head of the
computer team. His job: build and launch
the company’s online trading system.
Wasendorf Sr. was launching or build-
ing up a variety of dierent companies - a
securities brokerage in 2001, a hedge fund
in 2004, a publishing house and a construc-
tion company in 2007. Some were ops.
All, Wasendorf said later in his confession
letter, were part of his attempt to bring in
new revenue to repay the money he had
been stealing from customers.
His strangest bet ultimately became the
most protable, at least on paper.
Alexander Hergan, a founding member of
the Chicago Board Options Exchange, ap-
You could not have sent me
a more clear message of the low
regard you hold me and my firm.
Russell Wasendorf Sr.
in a letter to Jack Sander, former chairman of the
Chicago Mercantile Exchange in Oct. 2000
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