MEMORANDUM FOR THE DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

5000 DEFENSE PENTAGON

WASHINGTON, DC 20301-5000

INTELLIGENCE

SUBJECT: Senator Harry Reid's Request to Put the Advanced Aerospace Threat and

Identification Program (AAITP) under Special Access Protection

Senator Harry Reid sent a letter to you on June 24, 2009 requesting the

Department of Defense put the AAITP under 'Restricted Special Access Protection'(Tab

A), The AAITP that SEN Reid refers to is officially the Advanced Aerospace Weapon

System Application Program (AAWSAP) contract managed by DIA. Its primary purpose

is to investigate revolutionary advances in future aerospace technologies with emphasis

on research of unconventional and revolutionary technologies. The sole bid for the

contract was from Bigelow Aerospace Advance Space Studies located in Las Vegas, NV.

The resulting contract was for multiple sub-contractors to perform unclassified research

in 11 technical areas and deliver technical reports on those areas by July 31 2009.

(b)(3):10 USC 424;(b)(6)



directed a quality review or the tecnnical reports tnat

VIA

completed in October 2009.

In late October 2009, DIA completed the technical review of the program

deliverables (Tab B) and provided USD(I) SAPCO the current status of the AAWSAP.

The program manager and his leadership advised that they saw no justification for

Special Access protections based on the content of the FY09 deliverables or the

anticipated FY10 work. This

recommendation is formally stated

and outlined in the

attached memorandum from

(b)(3):10 USC 424;(b)(6)



(Tab C).

Senators Reid and Inouye co-sponsored a $10M earmark in the July 2008

supplemental to fund this DIA effort to look at potential future aerospace weapons

threats. A $12M earmark has been allocated to support the program in FY2010.

Based on the recommendation from DIA and my staffs review of the technical

reports, I recommend against establishing a Special Access Program at this time.

James R. Clapper Jr.

Attachments: As stated

Talking Points

DepSecDef Meeting with Senator Harry Reid

November 17, 2009

Topic: Senator Harry Reid's Request to Protect the Advanced Aerospace Weapon

System Application Program as a Special Access Program

Background

•

Early 2008: Senator Reid met tb

10 USG 424 (b)

a DIA analyst, at a technical

conference.

•

July 2008: Senators Reid and Inouye co-sponsored a $10M earmark in the

Supplemental Appropriation Bill to assess far-term foreign advanced aerospace threats

to the United States. A $12M earmark has been allocated to support the project in

FY2010.

•

August 2008: DIA learned of counter-intelligence concerns with Bigelow Aerospace,

the parent company of Bigelow Aerospace Advance Space Studies. These concerns do

not appear to be directly related to Advanced Aerospace Weapon System Application

Program (AAWSAP).

•

September 2008: DIA awarded the contract to the sole bidder, Bigelow Aerospace

Advance Space Studies (Las Vegas, NV), to perform unclassified research in 11

technical areas and deliver technical reports on those areas by July 31, 2009.

is the Program Manager for the AAWSAP. Its primary purpose

is to investigate revolutionary advances in future aerospace technologies with

emphasis on research of unconventional and revolutionary technologies.



Senator Reid's office refers to the AAWSAP as the Advanced Aerospace Threat

and Identification Program.

•

May 19, 2009:

(b)(3):10 USC 424;(b)(6)



met with Senator Reid about several

issues, one of them being the AAWSAP. The project was briefly discussed and limited

feedback was provided.

(b)(3) 10 USG 424 (b)(6)

did not commit to SAP the program.

•

June 24, 2009: Senator Harry Reid sent a letter to Deputy Secretary Lynn requesting

that DoD put the Advanced Aerospace Weapon System Application Program

(AAWSAP) under Special Access Protection (Tab A).

•

July 31,2009: DIA received all 26 papers, based on research in 12 technical areas.

•

July — October 2009: Bob Herbert, Senator Reid's personal staffer, made multiple

phone calls to Marcel Lettre, PDASD/LA, inquiring on the status of our response to the

June 24

letter.

•

October 30, 2009: DIA completed quality reviews of all papers and provided an

assessment to Lt. Gen. Burgess (Tab B). The papers are currently Unclassified//For

Official Use Only.

(b)(3):10 USC 424;(b)(6)

•

November 4,2009:

(b)(3):10 USC 424;(b)(6)

met with Senator Reid's personal staffer, Bob Herbert. Mr. Herbert relayed the

Senator's impatience with the DoD's lack of response to the June 24

letter.

(b)(3) 10 USC 424:(b)

/C\



assured Mr. Herbert that DIA would provide an assessment to OSD regarding

classification of the project in the coming weeks.

•

November 13 2009:

(b)(3) 10 USC 424,(b)(6)



sent a memorandum to

USD(1) SAPCO outlining the results of their official review of Senator Reid's Special

Access Program request (Tab C). DIA can see no justification for Special Access

Protections based on the content of the FY09 deliverables or the anticipated FY10

work.

Key Talking Points

•

The FY09 deliverables for AAWSAP are for academic research and basic scientific

research. The FY09 technical reports are being used to expand the FY10 research into

the realm of scientific and technical intelligence.

•

The current level of scientific capability does not appear to risk grave damage to

national security if available information was revealed.

•

Some topics may warrant

Secret" classification consistent with the subject matter

being researched.

•

The department has reviewed all available information regarding the FY10 research and

finds no justification for applying Special Access Program protection at this time.

Attachments

•

Tab A

June 24, 2009 Letter from Senator Reid to Deputy Secretary Lynn

•

Tab B

October 30, 2009 Memorandum from

(b)(3):10 USC 424;(b)(6)

Subject. Review ol Advanced Aerospace Contract Deliverables

•

Tab C

November 13, 2009 Memorandum from

(b)(3):10 USC 424;(b)(6

USD(I) SAPCO, Subject: Review of Special Access Program Request

Prepared by:

(b)(3):10 USC 424;(b)(6)

(b)(

HARRY REID

NEVADA

MAJORITY LEADER

ilmted *tam *ante

WASHINGTON, DC 20510-7012

June 24, 2009

Honorable William Lynn

III

Deputy Secretary of Defense

1010 Defense Pentagon

Washington, DC 20301-1010

Dear Secretary Lynn:

Beginning this past September, the U.S. Senate has mandated that the Defense Intelligence

Agency assess far-term foreign advanced aerospace threats to the United States. The scope of

program interest covers from the present out to forty years and beyond. In order to further our

effort in recognizing emerging disruptive aerospace technologies, technical studies are being

conducted in regard to advanced lift, propulsion, the use of unconventional materials and

controls, signature reduction, weaponry, human interface and human effects.

Since the Advanced Aerospace Threat and Identification Program (AAITP) and study were

first commissioned, much progress has been made with the identification of several highly

sensitive, unconventional aerospace-related findings. Given the current rate of success, the

continued study of these subjects will likely lead to technology advancements that in the

immediate near-term will require extraordinary protection. Due to the sensitivities of the

information surrounding aspects of this program, I require your assistance in establishing a

Restricted Special-Access-Program (SAP) with a Bigoted Access List for specific portions of the

AATIP.

In order to support this national effort, a small but highly specialized cadre of Department of

Defense (DoD) and private sector individuals are necessary. These individuals must be

specialized in the areas of advanced sciences, sensors, intelligence/counterintelligence, and

advanced aerospace engineering. Given the likelihood that these technologies will be applied to

future systems invoking space flight, weapons, communications, and propulsion, the standard

management and safeguarding procedures for classified information are not sufficient. Even the

use of conventional SAP protocols will not adequately ensure that all aspects of the project are

properly secured. Although not every aspect of AATIP requires Restricted SAP read-on, the

following portions should be maintained at the Restricted SAP level:

•

The methodology used to identify, acquire, study, and engineer the advanced

technologies associated with AATIP.



Specific methodologies used to study unconventional technology may require

nuanced approaches that will undoubtedly be of significant interest if not a top

priority for adversarial Foreign Intelligence Security Services (PISS).

Undue attention by government, or private sector entities, not involved in AATIP

or any international interest will directly or indirectly interfere with the daily

AATIP mission and perhaps threaten the overall success of the program.

Allocation of personnel, support, and oversight.

Due to the highly specialized nature of the personnel involved with AATIP, the

overt acknowledgement of their participation in the program will lead to an

unnecessary security and counterintelligence risk.

Occasional assistance from specialized individuals within DoD, the scientific

community, or academia may be necessary from time to time based on

demonstrated subject matter expertise. Adequate protection of their identities or

affiliation is critical to avoid unnecessary scrutiny.

Without the appropriate Restricted SAP protection, the cost associated with a

compromise would be significantly higher than the cost associated with a

properly administered Restricted SAP.

Protection of industry partnerships and participation is critical. Public

awareness of an industry's AATIP affiliation may discourage that industry's

further participation with the U.S. Government in this program.

Application and engineering.

The nuanced manner in which some of these technologies will be collected,

engineered and applied by the U.S. may require senior level government approval.

These decision makers must be afforded the necessary time to make strategic

decisions by restricting access to the "big picture" or overall intent of the program

to those on a strict Bigoted List.

Associated exotic teclmologies likely involve extremely sophisticated concepts

within the world of quantum mechanics, nuclear science, electromagnetic theory,

gravitics, and thermodynamics. Given that all of these have the potential to be

used with catastrophic effects by adversaries, an unusually high degree of

operational security and read-on discretion is required.

Due to the expertise required to carry out the objectives of this program, we will require a

small, specialized group of DoD personnel, who are dedicated to performing the SAP-related

functions and executing programmatic requirements within the program. It is essential that the

Government & military personnel who are already involved with this program are assigned to

further support this program in a Restricted SAP capacity (see Attachment I). These individuals

all currently possess the appropriate security clearances and are already providing unique support

to AATIP.

Ultimately, the results of AATIP will not only benefit the US. Government but I believe will

directly benefit DoD in ways not yet imagined. The technological insight and capability gained will

provide the U.S. with a distinct advantage over any foreign threats and allow the U.S. to maintain its

preeminence as a world leader.

Thank you in advance from your time and consideration of this reques If

you or your staff have any questions, please contact (b)(6)

Sincerely,

HYY REI

United States Senator

HR:rth

10.

Special Agent

11.

SMC)

USD (Gov't)

USDI (Gov't)

(b)(6)

•

NI (U

Bigelow Aerospace Advanced Space Studies LLC (BAASS),

BAASS (CTR)

AASS (CTR)

Attachment 1

Sponsoring Agency:

Undetermined (DEPSECDEF)

Component-level SAP Central Office:

Undetermined (DEPSECDEF)

Unclassified Nickname:

Advanced Aerospace Threat Identification Program (AATIP)

Program Length:

FY09-FY13 (Preliminary)

Program Funding:

FY09-0&M, FYI 0-FY13-TBD

SAP Category Designation:

Intelligence, DoD Acquisition

FY 10 Preliminary Bigoted List of Government Personnel:

Honorable William Lynn III, Deputy Secretary of Defense (Gov't)

Honorable Senator Harry Reid of Nevada (Gov't)

Honorable Senator Daniel Inouye of Hawaii (Gov't)

Robert T. Herbert .S Senate

(b)(3):10 USC 424;(b)(6)

FY 10 Preliminary Bigoted List of Contractor Personnel funded under the AATIP:

This document contains information exempt from mandatory disclosure under the FOIA.

Exemptions 1 and 5 apply.

(U) This info memo responds to your request for the

o review the quality and value of the first-year technical reports delivered

un er t e Advanced Aerospace Weapon System Applications contract with

Bigelow Aerospace Advanced Space Studies (BAASS). LLC. As a reminder, you

made this request to

(b)(3) 10

•ersonnel during a 15 May 2009 meeting with you

USG 424

after your meeting wi



ena or Harry Reid. The goal of the contract is to identify

key technologies and physics concepts that would support revolutionary aerospace

vehicle research and development. Contracted studies were designed to provide a

prioritized list of technologies/concepts that then would drive detailed, focused

searches into foreign aerospace research and development. Each research report

fin the areas of lift, propulsion, control, power generation, spatial/temporal

translation, materials, structural configuration, signature reduction, human

interface, human effects, and armament) was written by world-class technical

experts in industry and/or academia.

(b)(3):10 USC 424

(b)(3) 10 USG 424

UNCLASSIFIED

INFO MEMO

U-429-09/

(b)(3):10 USC 424



30 October 2009

FOR:

(b)(3):10 USC 424

FROM:

(b)(3):10 USC 424;(b)(6)

Defense Intelligence Agency

SUBJECT: (U) Review of Advanced Aerospace Contract Deliverables

(U) The table in Enclosure 1 lists the 26 extensive technical reports delivered to

DIA in FY 2009. The report titles highlighted in red and green are the ones that

were reviewed. Eight reviews were performed by other authors listed in the table;

five were performed by outside reviewers, including three research staff members



Sandia National Laboratories. The

(b)(3) 10 USC 424:(b)(6)



has reviewed all of the papers and concurs with the reviews. As the

excerpts indicate, all of the reviews were positive, some exceptionally so. Even

within the limitation of being able to conduct only unclassified research in the first

contract year, the quality hoped for in the reports was achieved.



s to

publish them in coming weeks as Defense Intelligence Studies. Some or all of

these studies may be of interest to Defense Department agencies, national

laboratories, and/or defense industries focused on blue-force capability

development, anj



wilt ensure that they receive copies.

(b)(3):10 USC 424

(b)(3):10 USC 424;(b)(6)

(b)(3)

:1O USC

AlA

UNCLASSIFIED

(U) Based on draft budget guidance, Congress apparently will fund the contract's

option year one at $12 million. In FY 2010,



will "Se the 26 FY 2009

technical reports in having BAASS evaluate potential adversary exploitation

worldwide, select studies amenable to classified experimental verification by

BAASS, and have BAASS conduct new classified and unclassified studies with

select academic and industry partners. Deliverables are expected in late summer

2010.

2 enclosures as stated

(b)(3):10 USC 424

(U) Prepared by:

(b)(3):10 USC 424;(b)(6)

UNCLASSIFIED

(U) FY 2009 Technical Reports

UNCLASSIFIED

Title



Author



Affiliation

Inertial Electrostatic Confinement Fusion



(b)(6)

Pulse-Power-Based Weaponry

Space-Time Modifications for Spaceflight Applications

Novel MEMS-Based Biosensors

Theory and Experiments of Invisibility Cloaking

Wormholes in Space Time

Gravity Wave Communication

Superconductors in Gravity Research

Antigravity for Aerospace Applications

Field Effects on Biological Tissues

Positron Aerospace Propulsion

Vacuum Energy Applications

Improved Statistical Approach to Drake Equation

Maverick vs. Corporate Research Cultures

Biosensors and BioMEMS

Metamaterials for Aerospace Applications

Warp Drives

Controlling Devices Without Limb-Operated Interfaces

Materials for Advanced Aerospace Platforms

Metallic Glasses

Programmable Matter

Metallic Spintronics

High-Energy Laser Weapons

Quantum Entanglement Communications

Space Access: Where Been, Where Go

Advanced Nuclear Propulsion for Deep Space

Red — Independent review.

Green — Sandia National Laboratories review.

UNCLASSIFIED

(U) Excerpts From Reviews

(U) All of the following review information and comments are UNCLASSIFIED.

Antigravity for Aerospace Ap lications in 2050

(b)(6)



has provided an excel ent overview of conventional approaches to

gravity manipulation within the confines of Newtonian, relativistic and quantum

physics. With his typical lucid style, he takes the time to add useful explanatory

notes which are especially enlightening for those for whom Relativity is not their

first language. In addition, his extensive technical appendix concerning such

exotica as squeezed vacuum states, zero-point fluctuations and negative energy is

of great benefit.

(b)(6)

Technological Approaches to Controlling External Devices in the Absence of

Limb Operated Interfaces

(b)(6)

The paper by

(b)(6)



looks at the present and future prospects for the

human thought control of robotics and machines by way of high technology neural

interfaces. The ultimate aim of such research is to allow an individual to control

the function of a prosthetic or robot as an extension of his own body and mind or

to exercise thought-based control over a mechanized environment. We find from

(b)(6)



urrent review that the state of the art is still quite far away from

achieving such control but strong efforts are being made on a number of

approaches.

(b)(6)

On The Role of Superconductors in Gravity Research

(b)(6)

Because of the author's involvement and activity in the field, it seems natural that

he chose to write on this subject, and he is able to demonstrate not only a solid

UNCLASSIFIED

understanding of the research area, but is also able to provide his personal

accounts of meetings with the prominent researchers. In addition, he describes his

own experimental results, or lack thereof Because of his own personal attachment

to the field, I found the report to be somewhat captivating, as I felt a strong sense

of being close to the research and hearing from the 'horse's mouth, 'so to speak

Despite his involvement,

(b)(

)



point of view seems to be that of an impartial

observer and he does not appear to take sides, or seem to be trying to promote or

'sell' the research field. He does an excellent job of relaying a candid and

informative survey of what, to me, seems to be a tantalizing yet controversial field

of study.

(b)(6)

Metallic Glasses: Status and Prospects for Aerospace Applications

(b)(6)

This is an excellent and highly readable Survey report that defines Metallic

glasses, the advantages and disadvantages to other composite materials, and how

their mechanical properties are both alike and different from those of pure metals.

These properties include strength, stiffness, and toughness. The author makes a

case that the processing capability meets and sometimes exceeds those of

thermoplastic polymers, and traditional metals. Glass hybrid composites are found

to excel in almost all cases to current materials in widespread use.

(b)(6)

Theory and Experiments of Invisibility Cloaking

(b)(6)

The report by

(b)(6)



escribes the background and recent advances in the

field of invisibility cloaking. Th's field recently emerged as one of the most

exciting applications of metamaterials — artificially structured media possessing

unusual refractive properties.

(b)(6)



_is a pioneer in this field, having

published one of the first theoretical papers describing the possibility of cloaking.

This topic still evokes misunderstandings and confusion. That is not surprising:

the concept of invisibility (although not its technical im lementation) has been

preoccupying people for centuries if not millennia

(b)(

)



report does an

excellent job of clearing some of this confusion an provi ing c ear definitions of

what constitutes true cloaking/invisibility. It also honestly discusses technological

challenges to making a practical invisibility cloak.

UNCLASSIFIED

(b)(6)

Positron Aerospace Propulsion

(b)(6)

This status paper is very exciting and provides new important information about

the present status and prospects for positron energy production and storage,

especially for space applications. It is recommended reading for both researchers

in the area and aerospace scientists. In addition, others interested in national

policy for both future energy and future space exploration should consider this

status paper to gain further insight into positron energy and propulsion.

(b)(6)

Metamaterials for Aerospace Applications: Energy Harvesting, Sub-

Wavelength Imaging, Optical-Device Miniaturization, and Non-Reciprocal

Optical Devices

(b)(6)

Metamaterials are "materials beyond materials" with unusual electromagnetic or

optical properties. The report by

(b)(6)



describes several possibilities

how such materials can be used for advanced aerospace applications. As

examples, he often uses his own experiments.

(b)(6)



is one of the research

leaders in the field of metamaterials and has built up a highly credible reputation

in this area. Although the research area of metamaterials is still rather new and

mostly confined to proof-of-principle academic research at present, it will

undoubtedly revolutionize photonics and lead to commercial applications that are

interesting for the aerospace industry.

(b)(6)

Biosensors and BioMEMS: A Survey of the Present Field

(b)(6)

This paper reaches toward and achieves a laudable goal: making BioMEMS

understandable and relevant. The author's contribution is important, because the

number of current programs and projects in the US Government that are either

touting the importance of or making responses to research requests in 2009

UNCLASSIFIED

numbers in the thousands. As many recent US Academy of Sciences and other

scholarly studies have shown, few persons in the decision-making areas of the

government have sufficient background in BioMEMS from which to make

intelligent decisions. As key customers of this study, the sponsors are well-served

with

(b)(6)



survey. Throughout the Survey, the author often introduces

ancillary technologies that will enable further BioMEMS development, solve

problems, or lead to alternative technologies. The survey is made more useful to

the reader and the sponsor because of this.

(b)(6)

Metallic Spintronics

(b)(6)

paper is concerned wffi an emerging technology known as

spin tronics ("spin-based electronics'). In this technology information is carried

by moving or alteringthe spin of electrons, rather than by moving the charged

articles themselves.

(b)(

)

articles



has at least a dozen publications in the field of study in top-tier

journals, and has won NSF grants to pursue the topic. As a result one must regard

him as an expert in the subject and take his opinions seriously. In addition, the

paper cites 97 references, which is quite a lot for a 10,000 word paper. Clearly,

is giving an overview of the entire field rather than just supplying an

incremental addition to it.

(b)(6)

Materials for Advanced Aerospace Platforms

(b)(6)

The position

(b)(

)



takes at the first instant is that previous design

methodologies have largely failed, because of a lack of appreciation of material

property life cycles, which are clearly now known to be very different. If one is to

examine, for example, in an attempt to reverse engineer materials and components

possibly of interest, one might want to approach the "reverse" paradigm from first

principles of materials in contexts of observed performance. (b)(6)



at the

beginning of the study subtly suggests that observed performance... or even

claimed performance... may be a better starting point.

UNCLASSIFIED

(b)(6)

(b)(6

UNCLASSIFIED

The author elegantly describes how this "commonly encountered inconsistency

between technical innovation and commercial progress" has become [in the West]

a current deterrent to the development and the deployment (adoption) of "literally

all classes...of polymers, metals, and ceramics."

(b)(6)

Metallic Glasses: Status and Prospects for Aerospace Applications

(b)(6)

I found it to be a clear and even-handed evaluation of the pros and cons of bulk

metallic glasses (BMG) and composites employing them. The author clearly points

out possible advantages in processing while he equally clearly points out the

difficulties associated with inherent unstable shear band formation and

consequent lack of general ductility.

(b)(6)

Theory and Experiments of Invisibility Cloaking

(b)(6)

Overall, this is a nice qualitatVe description of the rapidly moving field of

invisibility and cloaking and can serve as a good starting point for someone

interested in diving into the details of this new technology.

(b)(6)

State-of-the-Art & Evolution of High Energy Laser Weapons

(b)(6)

The technical discussions and history review are generally correct to the extent

they address the topics and this paper is a good general introduction for those

unfamiliar with high energy lasers.

(b)(6)

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED/71

04#0.•

DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20340-5100

INFO MEMO

U-09-26601(b)(3):10 USC 424

NOV 1 3 2089

FOR: DIRECTOR, SPECIAL PROGRAMS, OFFICE OF THE UNDER SECRETARY

OF DEFENSE FOR INTELLIGENCE

FROM:

(b)(3):10 USC 424;(b)(6)

Defense Intelligence Agency

SUBJECT: (U) Review of Special Access Program Request

(U/Plitle4

This info memo responds to your

request for the Defense Intelligence

Agency (DIA)

(b)(3):10

USC 424



to evaluate a request from Senator Harry

Reid (enclosure 1) to establish a restricted special access program (SAP) for the

Advanced Aerospace Weapon System Application Program Contract, referred to in

Senator Reid's letter as the Advanced Aerospace Threat and Identification Program

(AAITP). In reviewing the deliverables to date and looking ahead to planned production

in fiscal year (FY) 2010, DIA cannot find adequate justification to establish a restricted

SAP.



(b)(3):10 USC 424

(Ulifsiliele)

All program documents delivered to



during FY 2009 (the first year of

the program) were unclassified because the contractor had not established a secure

facility, and program employees were being vetted for clearances. In FY 2010, most

research products will remain at the unclassified level. However, four to six of the

original technical reports will be expanded to included classified data. These reports will

focus on foreign research in a particular technology area and will likely be derivatively

classified at the secret level. Based on classification levels of current and projected

program deliverables, there are insufficient grounds to classify this open program, invoke

alternative or compensatory control measures (ACCM), or establish a restricted SAP.

•

(Uhlifwelei)

Classifying the overall program by derivative means is impractical given

Department of Defense Regulation, DoD 5200.1 -R Information Security Program

guidance: No reports produced thus far have extracted, paraphrased, or restated

information obtained from previously classified material (para C3.1.1). Future reports

that contain classified information will be marked and protected according to the

original classification authority (para C3.1.2.I.1).

•

(Uhif•Iiiiii* Classifying the overall program by original means is inadvisable:

Information contained in the reports is not owned by, produced by or for, or under

control of the U.S. government (para C2.3.1.1). DIA cannot identify any damage that

UNCLASSIFIED/44MS

UNCLASSIFIED/Sib

could result from unauthorized disclosure (para C2.3.13) of publically available

information. Although the information can loosely be tied to one of the eligibility

criteria for classification (scientific, technological, or economic matters relating to the

national security (para C2.3.2.5)), DIA is prohibited from classifying basic scientific

research, and its result, unless it clearly relates to national security (para C2.4.3.2).

This requirement has not been met.

•

(1.1/44/Ja)

In the second paragraph of his letter, Senator Reid cites "the identification

of several highly sensitive, unconventional aerospace-related findings" that will

"require extraordinary protection." Although most of the unclassified reports discuss

unconventional aerospace technologies, DIA is unaware of any report containing

information sufficiently sensitive and vulnerable to require extra protection associated

with either ACCM or a restricted SAP (paras C6.8.1.2 and C8.I .1.3). DIA assumes

these statements are in reference to future phases of this program and highlight

security and counterintelligence concerns that appear to be the main focus of Senator

Reid's letter.

(U)ff#144).Pursuant to a request from the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for

Intelligence, Special Programs staff, (b)(3):10 USC 424;(b)(6)



for the

Advanced Aerospace Weapon System Application Program Contract, has forwarded draft

copies of technical reports from the first year, which will be published in the coming

months. If you have questions about the contents of these reports, please contact

(b)(3) 10 USG 424 (b)(6)

b)(3):10 USC 424;(b)(6)



IHe will arrange to have (b)(3):10 USC 424;(b)(6)

review the reports with your staff.

(U) Prepared by:

(b)(3):10 USC 424;(b)(6)

UNCLASSIFIED/14/040

Subject: Review of Special Access Request

(b)(3):10 USC 424;(b)(6)

DIA

SIOJECT:

Review of Special Ac

Date Received: 4 Nov 09



Dle

Vted-In

gin

DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

Washington, D.C. 20340

0001

TO:

(b)(3):10 USC 424;(b)(6)

INITIAI.

DATE

(b)(3):10 USC 424;(b)

(6)

at Nov 09

vcfr

Attached please revised subject info memo to OUSD(I) for your

review and approval. This version incorporates CP comments.

Very Respectfully,

lp tar]

(b)(3):10 USC 424;(b)(6)

(b)(3):10 USC 424

(tio.X.LcZ tcSO

(b)(3):10 USC 424;(b)(6)



mid t Muni

PREVIOUS EDMON OBSOLETE



DO NOT REMOVE

0RM FROM PACKAGE

(b)(3):10 USC

424