THREAT ASSESSMENT
IN SCHOOLS:
A GUIDE TO MANAGING
THREATENING SITUATIONS
AND TO CREATING
SAFE SCHOOL CLIMATES
UNITED STATES SECRET SERVICE AND
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION
WASHINGTON, D. C.
July 2004
i
THREAT ASSESSMENT IN SCHOOLS:
A GUIDE TO MANAGING THREATENING SITUATIONS
AND TO CREATING SAFE SCHOOL CLIMATES
UNITED STATES SECRET SERVICE
AND
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION
by
Robert A. Fein, Ph.D.
Director
National Violence Prevention and Study Center
Bryan Vossekuil
Director
National Violence Prevention and Study Center
William S. Pollack, Ph.D.
Director, National Violence Prevention and Study Center
Assistant Clinical Professor
Harvard Medical School / McLean Hospital
Randy Borum, Psy.D.
Associate Professor
University of South Florida
William Modzeleski
Associate Deputy Under Secretary
Office of Safe and Drug-Free Schools
U. S. Department of Education
Marisa Reddy, Ph.D.
Chief Research Psychologist and Research Coordinator
National Threat Assessment Center
U. S. Secret Service
Washington, D. C.
July 2004
P
REFACE
iii
Joint message from the Secretary, U.S. Department of Education, and from the
Director, U.S. Secret Service
Since June 1999, the U.S. Department of Education and the U.S. Secret Service have
been working as a team to try to better understand–and ultimately help
prevent–school shootings in America. When we began this collaboration nearly
three years ago, we did not know what information we might uncover in the course
of our joint study on targeted violence in schools, known as the Safe School Initiative.
However, throughout our collaboration, our two agencies have focused on one
common goal: to develop accurate and useful information about prior school attacks
that could help prevent some future ones from occurring.
We believe the results of this effort have given schools and communities real cause
for hope. Through the
Safe School Initiative, staff from the U.S. Department of
Education’s Safe and Drug-Free Schools Program and the U.S. Secret Service’s
National Threat Assessment Center have found that some school attacks may be
preventable. The companion report to this document,
The Final Report and Findings
of the Safe School Initiative: Implications for the Prevention of School Attacks in the
United States
, details findings from the Safe School Initiative and includes several key
findings relevant to prevention efforts. In particular, the Safe School Initiative
findings indicate that incidents of targeted violence in school were rarely impulsive;
that the students who perpetrated these attacks usually planned out the attack in
advance–with planning behavior that was oftentimes observable; and that, prior to
most attacks, other children knew that the attack was to occur. Taken together, these
findings suggest that it may be possible to prevent some future school attacks from
occurring–and that efforts to identify, assess, and manage students who may have the
intent and capacity to launch an attack may be a promising strategy for prevention.
This document,
Threat Assessment in Schools: A Guide to Managing Threatening
Situations and to Creating Safe School Climates, takes these findings one step further
by setting forth a process for identifying, assessing, and managing students who may
pose a threat of targeted violence in schools. This process–known as threat
assessment–was first pioneered by the U.S. Secret Service as a mechanism for
investigating threats against the president of the United States and other protected
officials. The Secret Service threat assessment approach was developed based upon
findings from an earlier Secret Service study on assassinations and attacks of public
of
ficials and public figures.
This
Guide represents a modification of the Secret Service threat assessment process,
based upon findings from the
Safe School Initiative. It is intended for use by school
personnel, law enforcement officials, and others with protective responsibilities in
our nation’s schools. This Guide includes suggestions for developing a threat
assessment team within a school or school district, steps to take when a threat or
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HREAT ASSESSMENT IN SCHOOLS GUIDE
Disclaimer
The findings, conclusions, and
opinions expressed in this document
are those of the authors, and do not
necessarily reflect the official
position or policies of the U.S.
Department of Education or the
U.S. Department of the Treasury.
ii
A
CKNOWLEDGMENTS
v
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
The authors of this Guide are grateful to many agencies and individuals for their
assistance in planning and carrying out the Safe School Initiative and for assistance in
the development and writing of this
Guide. First and foremost, the authors owe a
debt of gratitude to the representatives of the numerous law enforcement and
criminal justice agencies that permitted Secret Service personnel to review
investigative files on the school attacks in their respective communities; provided
other key information and materials about these attacks; and assisted and supported
Secret Service personnel in seeking permission to interview 10 attackers. Moreover,
the authors are grateful to the U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Justice
Programs’ National Institute of Justice for providing critical financial support that
helped make the study possible.
This
Guide would not have been possible without the support and assistance that the
authors received from several key officials and personnel at the Department of
Education and the Secret Service. Absent the significant contributions of these
individuals, the Secret Service’s experience in researching and preventing targeted
violence could not have been translated into a useful guide about threat assessment
and targeted school violence. At the Department of Education, these individuals are:
Secretary of Education Rod Paige, Assistant Secretary for Office of Elementary and
Secondary Education Susan B. Neuman, and Connie Deshpande. Secret Service
officials who provided guidance and support for this project include: Director Brian
Stafford, Special Agent in Charge George Luczko, Assistant Special Agent in Charge
Matt Doherty, Assistant to the Special Agent in Charge Cindy Rubendall, and
Resident Agent in Charge John Berglund.
The authors extend special thanks to Assistant Director Barbara Riggs, Office of
Protective Research, U.S. Secret Service for her support of the
Safe School Initiative
and the National Threat Assessment Center.
The
Guide benefited from the thoughtful comments of a focus group of education
and law enforcement leaders that was organized by the Department of Education.
Participants in the group included: Ahndrea Blue, James Campain, Marilyn
Copeland, Melissa DeRosier, Steve Edwards, David Friedberg, Jeff Heller, Liz
Karnes, James Kelly, Wesley Mitchell, Lawrence Porte, Frank Sanchez, Jr., Kate
Stetzner, Melorra Sochet, Betsy Thompson, and John Van Dreal.
Finally, the authors acknowledge the contributions of Mary Rowe, Paul Gebicke,
Gw
en Holden and se
v
eral anonymous reviewers from the Department of Education,
whose observations and comments helped to shape the
Guide. Special thanks go out
to Gwen Holden and Paul Kelly, who helped edit the
Guide.
R
ober
t F
ein William Modzeleski
Bryan Vossekuil Marisa Reddy
William Pollack Washington, D.C.
Randy Borum May 2002
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HREAT ASSESSMENT IN SCHOOLS GUIDE
iv
other information of concern comes to light, consideration about when to involve law
enforcement personnel, issues of information sharing, and ideas for creating safe
school climates.
We applaud all of you working to keep children safe in school. We hope that the
information in this
Guide, and the companion Final Report, assist you in your
continued efforts to do so.
Rod Paige W. Ralph Basham
Secretary Director
U.S. Department of Education United States Secret Service
May 2002
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ABLE OF CONTENTS
vii
Chapter I: Introduction: Threat Assessment and the
Prevention of Targeted School Violence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1
Chapter II: Creating Climates of School Safety:
A Foundation for Reducing School Violence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .9
Chapter III: Key Findings of the Safe School Initiative’s
Study of Targeted School Violence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .15
Chapter IV: Implementing a School Threat Assessment Process . . . . . . . . . . .27
Chapter V: Conducting a School Threat Assessment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .41
Chapter VI: Managing a Threatening Situation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .61
Chapter VII: Action Plans for School Leaders:
Creating a Safe and Connected School Climate and
Implementing a Threat Assessment Program . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .67
Chapter VIII: Conclusion: Threat Assessment as a
Decision-Making Tool . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .75
Appendix: Annotated Resources . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .79
Author Brief Bios . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .87
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vi
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viii
C
HAPTER I - INTRODUCTION
CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION:
THREAT ASSESSMENT
AND THE PREVENTION
OF TARGETED SCHOOL
VIOLENCE
C
HAPTER I - INTRODUCTION
3
The vast majority of the nation’s students will complete their schooling without ever
being touched by peer violence. Nevertheless, recent school attacks carried out by
students have shaken the image of schools as reliably safe and secure environments
in which the qualifications of teachers and the efficacy of the educational curricula
are the most pressing concerns of educators and parents. Televised images of
frightened and injured students fleeing school grounds have imprinted themselves on
the American consciousness. "Columbine," the Littleton, Colo. high school that on
April 20, 1999, was the scene of the most violent of the school attacks recorded to
date in the United States, has entered contemporary vocabulary as a national symbol
of the violence that claimed the lives of 14 students and a teacher on that day.
Incidents of targeted school violence
1
occurred in 37 communities across the country
between December 1974 and May 2000. Compared to the other types of violence
and crime children face both in and outside of school, school-based attacks are rare.
While the Department of Education reports that 60 million children attend the
nation’s 119,000 schools, available statistics indicate that few of these students will
fall prey to serious violence in school settings.
2
However, highly publicized school shootings have created uncertainty about the
safety and security of this country’s schools and generated fear that an attack might
occur in any school, in any community. Increased national attention to the problem
of school violence has prompted educators, law enforcement officials, mental health
professionals, and parents to press for answers to two central questions: "Could we
have known that these attacks were being planned?" and, if so, "What could we have
done to prevent these attacks from occurring?"
For example, what should happen when a student comes to attention for saying
something or behaving in a manner that causes concern, as in the following
instances?
• "The kids are saying that Johnny told his friends not to go to the cafeteria at
noon on Tuesday because something big and bad is going to happen."
• Marty, who has appeared withdrawn and irritable the past few weeks, handed
in a story about a student putting a bomb in an empty school.
• Sandy brought bullets to school to show friends.
• Rafael, who got pushed around again after gym class, stormed out in tears,
shouting "You’re all going to pay!"
1
“Targeted violence” is defined as any incident of violence where a known or knowable attacker selects a
particular target prior to their violent attack. See Fein, R.A., Vossekuil, B. & Holden, G. "Threat Assessment:
An Approach to Prevent Targeted Violence."
Research in Action
. U.S. Department of Justice, Office of
Justice Programs, National Institute of Justice: Washington, D.C. (September, 1995), at 1-7. NCJ 155000
2
U.S. Department of Education. National Center for Education Statistics (2000).
Digest of Education
Statistics 2000
. Washington, D.C.: Authors
C
HAPTER I - INTRODUCTION
5
The Safe School Initiative was patterned after the Exceptional Case Study Project
(ECSP), the Secret Service’s earlier five-year study of the thinking and behavior of
individuals who carried out or attempted lethal attacks on public officials or
prominent individuals in the United States since 1949.
4
The purpose of the ECSP
was to generate a better understanding of attacks against public officials that, in turn,
would inform Secret Service agents’ investigations of threats against the president
and other Secret Service protectees, and the development of strategies to prevent
harm to these public officials.
In July 1998, the Secret Service and the Justice Department’s National Institute of
Justice released the publication,
Protective Intelligence and Threat Assessment
Investigations: A Guide for State and Local Law Enforcement Officials, in an effort to
make the Service’s threat assessment protocols available to a wider law enforcement
audience. That publication offers state and local police officials guidance in carrying
out and evaluating the findings of threat assessment investigations.
5
The Safe School Initiative study reinforced the findings of the Secret Service’s ECSP
study concerning the thinking and behavior of attackers. In particular, like the ECSP,
the
Safe School Initiative concluded that most attackers did not threaten their targets
directly, but did engage in pre-attack behaviors that would have indicated an
inclination toward or the potential for targeted violence had they been identified.
Findings about the pre-attack behaviors of perpetrators of targeted violence validated
the "fact-based" approach of the threat assessment process. This process relies
primarily on an appraisal of
behaviors, rather than on stated threats or traits, as the
basis for determining whether there is cause for concern. These findings argue
favorably for pursuing adaptation of this threat assessment process for use by school
administrators and law enforcement officials in responding to the problem of
targeted school violence.
The
Guide is intended to provide school administrators and law enforcement officials
guidance in incorporating the threat assessment process for investigating, evaluating,
and managing targeted violence into strategies to prevent school violence. The
purpose of the
Guide is to contribute to achieving the broader goal of creating safe
and secure school environments by helping school and law enforcement officials
respond responsibly, prudently, and effectively to threats and other behaviors that
raise concern about potential violence.
Eff
ective threat assessment can only occur in a larger context of school safety.
Cultur
es and climat
es of saf
e
ty, respect, and emotional support can help diminish the
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HREAT ASSESSMENT IN SCHOOLS GUIDE
• Casey, who was suspended last year for bringing a knife to school, left a "hit
list" on his desk.
• Terry submitted an essay in which an assassin blew up the school, attacked the
governor, and then killed himself.
Given the enormous concern about targeted school violence, these reported
statements and behaviors cannot be ignored. But how should school officials and
other responsible adults respond?
This publication,
Threat Assessment in Schools: A Guide to Managing Threatening
Situations and to Creating Safe School Climates
, is the product of an ongoing
collaboration between the U. S. Secret Service and the U. S. Department of
Education to begin to answer these questions. Its focus is on the use of the threat
assessment process pioneered by the Secret Service as one component of the
Department of Education’s efforts to help schools across the nation reduce school
violence and create safe climates. As developed by the Secret Service, threat
assessment involves efforts to identify, assess, and manage individuals and groups
who may pose threats of targeted violence.
Development of the School Threat Assessment Process
This Guide is an outgrowth of the joint Secret Service/Department of Education Safe
School Initiative. This initiative, begun in June 1999, was undertaken to explore the
potential for adapting the threat assessment investigative process developed by the
Secret Service to the problem of targeted school violence.
The
Safe School Initiative, implemented through the Secret Service’s National Threat
Assessment Center and the Department of Education’s Safe and Drug-Free Schools
Program, combined the Department of Education’s expertise in helping schools
facilitate learning through the creation of safe environments for students, faculty, and
staff, and the Secret Service’s experience in studying and preventing targeted
violence.
The
Safe School Initiative began with a study of the thinking, planning, and other pre-
attack behaviors engaged in by students who carried out school shootings.
3
That
study examined 37 incidents of targeted school violence that occurred in the United
States from December 1974 through May 2000 when researchers concluded their
dat
a collection.
4
3
Vossekuil, B., Fein, R., Reddy, M., Borum, R., & Modzeleski, W.
The Final Report and Findings of the Safe
School Initiative: Implications for the Prevention of School Attacks in the United States
. U.S. Secret Service
and U.S. Department of Education: Washington, D. C. (May 2002), at 15. [hereinafter
The Safe School
Initiative Final Report
]. For a fuller discussion of the Safe School Initiative, its methodology, and findings,
please r
efer to this r
eport.
4
Fein, R. & V
ossekuil, B. "Assassination in the United States: An Operational Study of Recent Assassins,
Attackers, and Near-Lethal Approachers."
Journal of Forensic Sciences
, 44 (1999), at 321-333.
5
Fein, R. & Vossekuil, B.
Protective Intelligence and Threat Assessment Investigations: A Guide for State
and Local Law Enforcement Officials
. U. S. Department of Justice, Office of Justice Pr
ograms, National
Institute of Justice: W
ashington, D. C. (July 1998).
C
HAPTER I - INTRODUCTION
7
threat assessment inquiry or investigation.
6
Chapter VI addresses the issue of
managing threatening situations.
Chapter VII presents an action plan for creating safe school cultures and climates
and an action plan to help school leaders implement a threat assessment program.
In the final chapter of the
Guide, Chapter VIII, the authors reassert the importance
of the threat assessment process as a component of broader school safety and
violence prevention strategies. In addition, the authors offer some concluding
observations on the efficacy of the threat assessment process as a tool that can help
school administrators, law enforcement officials, and others to make critical
decisions about responding to situations involving the threat of targeted school
violence.
Readers will find additional resources to inform the development and
implementation of school threat assessment processes in the appendix that is
included at the end of the
Guide. The appendix provides an annotated list of
publications and other resources on threat assessment and related topics.
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HREAT ASSESSMENT IN SCHOOLS GUIDE
possibility of targeted violence in schools. Environments in which students, teachers
and administrators pay attention to students’ social and emotional needs–as well as
their academic needs–will have fewer situations that require formal threat
assessments.
In an educational setting where there is a climate of safety, adults and students
respect each other. This climate is defined and fostered by students having a positive
connection to at least one adult in authority. In such a climate, students develop the
capacity to talk and openly share their concerns without fear of shame and reprisal.
They try to help friends and fellow students who are in distress, bringing serious
concerns to the attention of adults.
Ideally when this climate of safety is created, students
experience a sense of emotional "fit" and of respect.
Problems are raised and addressed before they
become serious. As a result, the potential for school
violence diminishes. When a member of the school
community shows personal pain that might lead them
to harm themselves or others, someone is available.
Young people can find an adult to trust with this
information, so that it does not remain "secret" until it
is too late.
A young man who brought a rifle into school, killing
two students, and wounding several others, told us
from his prison cell: "I was really hurting. I didn’t
have anybody to talk to. They just didn’t care."
Organization of the
Guide
The remainder of this Guide is organized into seven chapters. Chapter II of the
Guide discusses characteristics of safe school climates. Chapter III presents the key
findings of the
Safe School Initiative and discusses the implications of these findings
for the prevention of targeted school violence. Chapter IV describes the principles
underlying the threat assessment approach to preventing targeted violence, and
outlines the central elements of a threat assessment process.
Chapt
er
s V and VI will be of par
ticular interest to school administrators, law
enforcement officials, and others who wish to pursue the development of a threat
assessment pr
ocess as a com
ponent of a br
oader school violence pr
e
v
ention strategy.
Chap
t
er V outlines t
he approach to identifying students whose behavior may suggest
t
he potential for targeted school violence, and discusses the steps in carrying out a
6
6
This
Guide
distinguishes between a threat assessment
inquiry
and a threat assessment
investigation
.
Threat assessment inquiries are initiated, conducted, and controlled by school officials (often with input or
participation fr
om law enforcement professionals), while threat assessment investigations are initiated,
conducted, and controlled by law enforcement officials. Each school system or community should decide
where to place the line between an "inquiry" and an "investigation." For further discussion, please see
Chapter V
.
A young man who
brought a rifle into
school, killing two
students, and wounding
several others, told us
from his prison cell: "I
was really hurting. I
didn’t have anybody to
talk to. They just didn’t
care."
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HREAT ASSESSMENT IN SCHOOLS GUIDE
8
C
HAPTER II - CREATING CLIMATES OF SCHOOL SAFETY
CHAPTER II
CREATING CLIMATES
OF SCHOOL SAFETY:
A FOUNDATION FOR
REDUCING SCHOOL
VIOLENCE
C
HAPTER II - CREATING CLIMATES OF SCHOOL SAFETY
11
"What I hate about this school is that I'm being picked on in the halls
and just about everywhere else"–A 14-year-old student
"School has always been hard for me, literally from the first day I
started elementary school. People saw me as a … good target. They
just started picking on me for no reason … they made fun of me [and,
now] I'm going through self-esteem issues because of the 11 years I
was a target."–An 18-year-old student.
"They want me to open up, express myself. Quite a funny notion,
ironic! If someone had helped me do that several years ago, I
probably would have turned out okay."–Comment in a diary by a 17-
year-old student who attacked others at school, then killed himself.
The threat assessment process described in this
Guide is presented as an approach to
addressing the problem of targeted school violence. Incidents of targeted school
violence are extreme and, thankfully, rare events. However, targeted school violence
is arguably only the tip of the iceberg of pain, loneliness, desperation, and despair
that many students in this nation’s schools deal with on a daily basis.
Threat assessment should be looked upon as one component in an overall strategy to
reduce school violence. The threat assessment process by itself is unlikely to have a
lasting effect on the problem of targeted school violence unless that process is
implemented in the larger context of strategies to ensure that schools offer their
students safe and secure learning environments. The principal objective of school
violence-reduction strategies should be to create cultures and climates of safety,
respect, and emotional support within educational institutions.
Fostering a Culture of Respect
In educational settings that support climates of safety, adults and students respect
each other. A safe school environment offers positive personal role models in its
faculty. It provides a place for open discussion where diversity and differences are
respected; communication between adults and students is encouraged and supported;
and conflict is managed and mediated constructively.
Cultur
es and climat
es of safety support environments in which teachers and
administrators pay attention to students’ social and emotional needs as well as their
academic needs. Such environments em
phasize "emo
tional int
ellig
ence" as well as
educational or int
ellectual pur
suits.
7
S
tudents e
xperience a sense of emotional "fit"
7
Goleman, D.
Emotional Intelligence
. New York: Bantam Books, (1995).
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HREAT ASSESSMENT IN SCHOOLS GUIDE
and of respect within the school body and may be less likely to engage in or be
victimized by harmful behavior.
8
A culture of safety creates "shame-free zones" in which daily teasing and bullying is
not accepted as a normal part of the adolescent culture.
9
School environments
characterized by bullying and meanness can lead to student isolation and fear. At
best, school environments that turn a blind eye to bullying and teasing inhibit the
work of school–learning and growth. At the worst, such environments allow
behavior that fosters fear and fury that stunts the healthy development of the victims
of that behavior, and may lead to psychological and physical violence.
Creating Connections Between Adults and Students
Connection through human relationships is a central component of a culture of safety
and respect. This connection is the critical emotional glue among students, and
between students and adults charged with meeting students’ educational, social,
emotional, and safety needs.
1
0
In a climate of safety, students have a positive connection to at least one adult in
authority. Each student feels that there is an adult to whom he or she can turn for
support and advice if things get tough, and with whom that student can share his or
her concerns openly and without fear of shame or reprisal. Schools in which
students feel able to talk to teachers, deans, secretaries, coaches, custodians,
counselors, nurses, school safety officers, bus drivers, principals, and other staff
support communication between students and adults about concerns and problems.
Schools that emphasize personal contact and connection between school officials and
students will take steps to identify and work with students who have few perceptible
connections to the school. For example, during staff meetings in a school in a
California School District, the names of students are posted, and school faculty
members are asked to put stars next to the names of those students with whom they
have the closest relationships. Faculty members then focus on establishing
relationships with those students with few stars next to their names.
12
C
HAPTER II - CREATING CLIMATES OF SCHOOL SAFETY
13
Breaking the "Code of Silence"
In many schools there is a pervasive sense among students and some adults that
telling grownups that another student is in pain or may pose a threat violates an
unwritten, but powerful, "code of silence." A code of silence has the potentially
damaging effect of forcing students to handle their pain and problems on their own,
without the benefit of adult support. These codes also suggest that a student should
not bring any concerns that he or she may have about a peer’s behavior to the
attention of responsible adults.
The findings of the
Safe School Initiative suggest that silence is far from golden. In
fact, study findings indicate that silence may be downright dangerous. The study
found that most school shooters shared their potentially lethal plans with other
students, but that students who knew of planned attacks rarely told adults.
In a climate of safety, students are willing to break the code of silence. Students are
more likely to turn to trusted adults for help in resolving problems. Moreover,
students are more willing to share their concerns about the problem behavior of
peers with their teachers and other adults in positions of authority within the school
without feeling that they are "snitching" or "ratting" on a buddy or friend.
As a result of responsible bystander behavior, serious problems come to adult
attention earlier, before these problems lead to violence. Problems are raised and
addressed before they become serious, and the potential for school violence arguably
is diminished. In an environment that encourages communication between students
and adults, information does not remain "secret" until it is too late. In fact, it is
considered good citizenship or even heroic to go to a teacher to share the fact that a
fellow student is in trouble and may be contemplating a dangerous act.
Major Components and Tasks for Creating a Safe/Connected School Climate
The major components and tasks for creating a safe school climate include:
• Assessment of the school’s emotional climate;
• Emphasis on the importance of listening in schools;
• Adoption of a strong, but caring stance against the code of silence;
• Prevention of, and intervention in, bullying;
• Involvement of all members of the school community in planning, creating,
and sustaining a school culture of safety and respect;
• Development of trusting relationships between each student and at least one
adult at school; and
• Creation of mechanisms for developing and sustaining safe school climates.
Discussion of t
hese com
ponents and tasks may be found in Chapter VII of this
Guide.
8
See, for example, Resnick,M.D., Bearman,P.S., Blum, R.W. et. al., (1997) "Protecting Adolescents from
Harm," JAMA, 278(10) pp. 823-832. See also www
.allaboutkids.umn.edu.
9
See Pollack, W.
Real Boys: Rescuing Our Sons from the Myths of Boyhood
. New York: Henry Holt, Inc.,
(1998).; Pollack, W., & Shuster, T. Real Boys’ Voices. New York: Random House, (2000).; Pollack, W., &
Cushman, K.
Real Boys Workbook
. New Y
ork: V
illar
d, (2001).
10
Pollack, W.
Real Boys
. (1998). See note #9.
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14
C
HAPTER III - KEY FINDINGS
CHAPTER III
KEY FINDINGS OF THE
SAFE SCHOOL INITIATIVE
’S
STUDY OF TARGETED
SCHOOL VIOLENCE
C
HAPTER III - KEY FINDINGS
17
This chapter summarizes the Safe School Initiative and the findings that support a
threat assessment process to identify, assess, and manage threatening situations in
schools. The
Safe School Initiative examined incidents of targeted school violence
from the time of the incident backward, to identify the attackers’ pre-incident
behaviors and communications and to explore whether such information might aid in
preventing future attacks.
The findings of the
Safe School Initiative suggest that there are productive actions
that educators, law enforcement officials, and others can pursue in response to the
problem of targeted school violence. Specifically,
Initiative findings suggest that
these officials may wish to consider focusing their efforts to formulate strategies for
preventing these attacks in two principal areas:
• developing the capacity to pick up on and evaluate available or knowable
information that might indicate that there is a risk of a targeted school attack;
and
• employing the results of these risk evaluations, or "threat assessments," in
developing strategies to prevent potential school attacks from occurring.
Support for these suggestions is found in the 10 key findings of the
Safe School
Initiative:
• Incidents of targeted violence at school are rarely sudden, impulsive acts.
• Prior to most incidents, other people knew about the attacker’s idea and/or
plan to attack.
• Most attackers did not threaten their targets directly prior to advancing the
attack.
• There is no accurate or useful "profile" of students who engage in targeted
school violence.
• Most attackers engaged in some behavior, prior to the incident, that caused
concern or indicated a need for help.
• Most attackers were known to have difficulty coping with significant losses or
personal failures. Many had considered or attempted suicide.
• Many attackers felt bullied, persecuted, or injured by others prior to the attack.
• Most attackers had access to and had used weapons prior to the attack.
• In many cases, other students were involved in some capacity.
• Despite prompt law enforcement responses, most shooting incidents were
stopped by means other than law enforcement intervention.
An overview of these findings, and their implications for the use of threat assessment
protocols to identify, assess, and manage possible targeted school violence, follows.
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HREAT ASSESSMENT IN SCHOOLS GUIDE
Implications of Key Findings for the Use of Threat Assessment Protocols
Key Finding 1
Incidents of targeted violence at school rarely are sudden, impulsive acts.
Explanation
Students who engaged in school-based attacks typically did not "just snap" and engage
in impulsive or random acts of targeted school violence. Instead, the attacks
examined under the
Safe School Initiative appeared to be the end result of a
comprehensible process of thinking and behavior–behavior that typically begins with
an idea, progresses to the development of a plan, moves on to securing the means to
carry out the plan, and culminates in an attack.
Example: One attacker asked his friends to help him get ammunition for one
of his weapons; sawed off the end of a rifle to make it easier to conceal
beneath his clothes; shopped for a long trench coat with his mother; and cut
the pockets out of the coat so that he could conceal the weapon within the
coat while holding it through one of the cut-out pockets. This same attacker
had a well-known fascination with weapons and frequently told his friends
that he thought about killing certain students at school.
Implications
The process of thinking and planning that leads up to an attack potentially may be
knowable or discernible from the attacker’s behaviors and communications. To the
extent that information about an attacker’s intent and planning is knowable and may
be uncovered before an incident, some attacks may be preventable. However, the
Safe School Initiative found that the time span between the attacker’s decision to
mount an attack and the actual incident may be short. Consequently, when
indications that a student may pose a threat to the school community arise in the
form of information about a possible planned attack, school administrators and law
enforcement officials will need to move quickly to inquire about and intervene in that
possible plan.
Ke
y Finding 2
Prior to most incidents, other people knew about the attacker’s idea and/or plan to
attack.
18
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HAPTER III - KEY FINDINGS
19
Explanation
In most cases, other young persons–friends, schoolmates, and/or siblings–knew
about the attacker’s idea or plan for a possible attack on the school before that
attack occurred. However, this information rarely made its way to an adult.
Example: One attacker had planned to shoot students in the lobby of his
school prior to the beginning of classes. He told two friends exactly what he
had planned and asked three other students to meet him in the mezzanine
overlooking the school lobby the morning of the planned attack, ostensibly so
that these students would be out of harm’s way. On most mornings, few
students would congregate in the mezzanine before the school day began.
However, on the morning of the attack, word about what was going to
happen spread to such an extent that, by the time the attacker opened fire in
his school lobby, 24 students had gathered in the mezzanine waiting for the
attack to begin. One student who knew about the attacker’s plans brought a
camera so that he could take pictures of the event.
Implications
First and foremost, this finding suggests that students can be an important part of
prevention efforts. A friend or schoolmate may be the first person to hear that a
student is thinking about or planning to harm someone. Nevertheless, for a variety
of reasons, those who have information about a potential incident of targeted school
violence may not alert an adult on their own. Schools can encourage students to
report this information in part by identifying and breaking down barriers in the
school environment that inadvertently may discourage students from coming forward
with this information. Schools also may benefit from ensuring that they have a fair,
thoughtful, and effective system to respond to whatever information students do
bring forward. If students have concerns about how adults will react to information
that they bring forward, they may be even less inclined to volunteer such information.
In addition, this finding highlights the importance in a threat assessment inquiry of
attempts to gather all relevant information from anyone who may have contact with
the student. Efforts to gather all potentially relevant pieces of information, however
innocuous they may appear on their own, from all individuals with whom the student
has contact may help to develop a more comprehensive picture of the student’s ideas,
activities, and plans. In the end, investigators likely will find that different people in
the student’s life may have different pieces of the puzzle.
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HREAT ASSESSMENT IN SCHOOLS GUIDE
Key Finding 3
Most attackers did not threaten their targets directly prior to advancing the attack.
Explanation
The Safe School Initiative found that most attackers in fact did not threaten their
target directly and some made no threat at all. Instead, other behaviors and
communications that may prompt concern, such as hearing that a young person is
talking about bringing a gun to school, are indicators of a possible threat and
therefore should prompt the initiation of efforts to gather information.
Implications
This finding underscores the importance of not waiting for a threat before beginning
an inquiry. School administrators, of course, should respond to all students who
make threats because the lack of response could be taken by the threatener as
permission to proceed with carrying out the threat. In the end, however, it is
important to distinguish between someone who
makes a threat–tells people they
intend to harm someone–and someone who
poses a threat–engages in behaviors that
indicate an intent, planning, or preparation for an attack. Those conducting threat
assessment inquiries should focus particular attention on any information that
indicates that a student poses a threat, regardless of whether the student has told a
potential target he or she intends to do them harm.
Key Finding 4
There is no accurate or useful "profile" of students who engage in targeted school
violence.
Explanation
The demographic, personality, school history, and social characteristics of the
attackers varied substantially. Moreover, knowing that an individual shares
characteristics, behaviors, features, or traits with prior school shooters does not help
in determining whether a particular student is thinking about or planning for a
violent act.
Example: In one case, the dean of students had commended a student for
improving his grades and behavior a few weeks before that student carried
out an attack at his school.
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HAPTER III - KEY FINDINGS
21
Implications
The use of profiles to determine whether a student is thinking about or planning a
violent attack is not an effective approach to identifying students who may pose a risk
for targeted violence at school or–once a student has been identified–for assessing
the risk that a particular student may pose a risk for targeted school violence.
Reliance on profiles to predict future school attacks carries two substantial risks: (1)
the great majority of students who fit any given profile of a "school shooter" actually
will not pose a risk of targeted violence; and, (2) using profiles will fail to identify
some students who in fact pose a risk of violence, but share few if any characteristics
with prior attackers.
Rather than trying to determine the "type" of student who may engage in targeted
school violence, an inquiry should focus instead on a student’s behaviors and
communications to determine if that student appears to be planning or preparing for
an attack. Rather than asking whether a particular student "looks like" those who
have launched school-based attacks before, it is more productive to ask whether the
student is on a path toward a violent attack, if so how fast the student is moving
toward attack, and where intervention may be possible.
Key Finding 5
Most attackers engaged in some behavior, prior to the incident, that caused others
concern or indicated a need for help.
Explanation
Several key findings point to the fact that young people send signals–both direct and
indirect–to others regarding their problems. The boys and young men who engaged
in the targeted school violence examined by the Safe School Initiative were not
"invisible" students. In fact, nearly all of these students engaged in behaviors that
caused concern to at least one person, usually an adult–and most concerned at least
three people.
Implications
This finding highlights the range of behaviors in a student’s life that may be
noticeable to adults and that could prompt some additional probing by a caring adult.
As was true in some of the incidents covered in the
Safe School Initiative’s study,
individuals in contact with the attacker each may have observed something of
concern about that student’s behavior, but not of sufficient concern for them to
notify anyone in a position to respond.
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HREAT ASSESSMENT IN SCHOOLS GUIDE
Educators and other adults can learn how to pick up on these signals and make
appropriate referrals. By inquiring about any information that may have prompted
some concern, an investigator may be able to develop a more comprehensive picture
of the student’s past and current behavior, and identify any indications that the
student is intent on or planning to attack. However, discretion should be exercised
in determining whom to talk to about the student, so as not to alienate or stigmatize
the student of concern.
Key Finding 6
Most attackers had difficulty coping with significant losses or personal failures.
Many had considered or attempted suicide.
Explanation
Man
y students, not just those who engaged in school-based attacks, experience or
perceive major losses in their lives. Most students who face a significant loss, or who
have difficulty coping with such a loss, are not going to be at risk for a school-based
attack. However, information that indicates a student is facing or having trouble
dealing with a significantly difficult situation may indicate a need to refer the student
to appropriate services and resources.
In addition, more than three-quarters of school shooters had a history of suicidal
thoughts, threats, gestures, or attempts. Most of these students were known to have
been severely depressed or desperate at some point before their attacks.
Example: One school shooter submitted a series of poems describing his
thoughts of suicide and homicide to his English teacher. One poem read:
Am I insane
To want to end this pain
To want to end my life
By using a sharp knife
Am I insane
Thinking life is profane
Knowing life is useless
Cause my emotions are a mess
Am I insane
Thinking I’ve nothing to gain
Considering suicide
Cause love has died
Am I insane
Wanting to spill blood like rain
Sending them all to Hell
From humanity I’ve fell
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HAPTER III - KEY FINDINGS
23
The teacher became concerned and recommended that the student receive
help. Help, however, was not offered. After failing to kill himself, this student
killed two adults at school. He hoped to be convicted of capital murder and
executed by the state.
Implications
In cases where there is concern about the possibility that a student may engage in
targeted violence, an inquiry or investigation should include attention to any
indication that a student is having difficulty coping with major losses or perceived
failures, particularly where these losses or failures appear to have prompted feelings
of desperation and hopelessness. An inquiry or investigation also should anticipate
changes in the life of a troubled student, and consider whether these changes might
increase–or decrease–the threat that the student poses.
Key Finding 7
Many attackers felt bullied, persecuted, or injured by others prior to the attack.
Explanation
Bullying was not a factor in every case, and clearly not every child who is bullied in
school will pose a risk for targeted violence in school. Nevertheless, in a number of
the incidents of targeted school violence studied, attackers described being bullied in
terms that suggested that these experiences approached torment. These attackers
told of behaviors that, if they occurred in the workplace, likely would meet legal
definitions of harassment and/or assault.
Example: In one situation, most of the attacker’s schoolmates described the
attacker as "the kid everyone teased." In witness statements from that
incident, schoolmates described how virtually every child in the school had at
some point thrown the attacker against a locker; tripped him in the hall; held
his head under water in the pool; or thrown things at him. Several
schoolmates had noted that the attacker acted differently in the days
preceding the attack in that he seemed more annoyed by and less tolerant of
the teasing than usual.
Implications
The prevalence of bullying found by the Safe School Initiative’s examination of
targeted school violence and in other recent studies should strongly support ongoing
efforts to reduce bullying in American schools. Educators can play an important role
in ensuring that students are not bullied in schools and that schools not only do not
permit bullying, but also empower other students to let adults in the school know if
students are being bullied.
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HREAT ASSESSMENT IN SCHOOLS GUIDE
Key Finding 8
Most attackers had access to and had used weapons prior to the attack.
Explanation
Almost two-thirds of attackers used a handgun in their attack. Almost half used a
rifle. Most attackers acquired weapons from their home or the home of a relative.
Approximately two-thirds of attackers had a history of using guns prior to the attack.
Implications
Access to weapons among some students may be common. However, when the idea
of an attack exists, any effort to acquire, prepare, or use a weapon or ammunition,
including bomb-making components, may be a significant move in the attacker’s
progression from idea to action. Any inquiry should include investigation of and
attention to weapons access and use and to communications about weapons.
The large proportion of attackers who acquired their guns from home points to the
need for schools and law enforcement officials to collaborate on policies and
procedures for responding when a student is thought to have a firearm in school. In
particular, schools should be aware of the provisions of the Federal Gun-Free
Schools Act, which generally requires a minimum one-year expulsion of students who
bring a gun to school and that all violations be reported to local law enforcement
officials.
Key Finding 9
In many cases, other students were involved in the attack in some capacity.
Explanation
The Safe School Initiative found that in over half of the incidents, others assisted in
the planning or execution of the attack by actively encouraging the attacker to shoot
others at school, or even helping to select targets and train the shooter in how to use
a weapon.
Example: One attacker’s original idea had been to bring a gun to school and
le
t other students see him with it. He wanted to look tough, so that the
students who had been harassing him would leave him alone. When the
att
ack
er shar
ed t
his idea wit
h two friends, however, they convinced him that
he could no
t jus
t sho
w up with a gun, but actually had to shoot at people at
the school in order to get the other students to leave him alone. It was after
this conversation that he decided to mount his school attack.
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HAPTER III - KEY FINDINGS
25
Implications
This finding highlights the importance of considering what prompting or
encouragement a student may receive from others in his life that influences any
intent, planning, or preparations for a potential attack. Any inquiry or investigation
of potential targeted school violence should include attention to the role that a
student’s friends or peers may be playing in that student’s thinking about and
preparations for an attack. It is possible that feedback from friends or others may
help to move a student from an unformed thought about attacking to developing and
advancing a plan to carry out the attack.
This finding speaks to the importance of school officials paying attention to the
"settings" and climates of their schools. Peers exert enormous influence over their
friends and schoolmates. And principals, teachers, counselors, coaches, and other
adults at school may make all the difference in preventing violence. An environment
in which it is clear that violence doesn’t solve problems, but only makes them worse,
may help prevent tragedy. A climate in which a young person is seen as a "snitch" or
a "rat" for telling an adult about a student in distress differs from one in which young
people know that they can call on adults to help students who are in pain.
Key Finding 10
Despite prompt law enforcement responses, most attacks were stopped by means
other than law enforcement intervention and most were brief in duration.
Explanation
Law enforcement authorities responded quickly to almost all calls from schools about
attacks. However, most attacks were resolved within minutes, without law
enforcement intervention.
Implications
The short duration of most incidents of targeted school violence argues for the
importance of developing preventive measures in addition to any emergency planning
for a school or school district. The preventive measures should include protocols
and procedures for responding to and managing threats and other behaviors of
concer
n.
In summar
y
, t
he f
indings of t
he
Saf
e Sc
hool Initiativ
e
sugg
es
t t
hat some futur
e school
att
ack
s may be preventable. The fact that most attackers engaged in pre-incident
planning behavior and shared their intentions and plans with others, suggests that
those conducting threat assessment inquiries or investigations could uncover these
types of information. The remainder of this
Guide sets forth how to develop a
capacity f
or and conduct a t
hreat assessment process.
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HREAT ASSESSMENT IN SCHOOLS GUIDE
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C
HAPTER IV - IMPLEMENTING A PROCESS
CHAPTER IV
IMPLEMENTING A
SCHOOL THREAT
ASSESSMENT
PROCESS
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HAPTER IV - IMPLEMENTING A SCHOOL THREAT ASSESSMENT PROCESS
29
The primary purpose of a threat assessment is to prevent targeted violence. The
threat assessment process is centered upon on analysis of the facts and evidence of
behavior in a given situation. The appraisal of risk in a threat assessment focuses on
actions, communications, and specific circumstances that might suggest that an
individual intends to mount an attack and is engaged in planning or preparing for
that event.
In a situation that becomes the focus of a threat assessment inquiry or investigation,
appropriate authorities gather information, evaluate facts, and make a determination
as to whether a given student
poses a threat of violence to a target. If an inquiry
indicates that there is a risk of violence in a specific situation, authorities conducting
the threat assessment collaborate with others to develop and implement a plan to
manage or reduce the threat posed by the student in that situation.
Six principles form the foundation of the threat assessment process. These
principles are:
• Targeted violence is the end result of an understandable, and oftentimes
discernible, process of thinking and behavior.
• Targeted violence stems from an interaction among the individual, the
situation, the setting, and the target.
• An investigative, skeptical, inquisitive mindset is critical to successful threat
assessment.
• Effective threat assessment is based upon facts rather than on characteristics
or "traits."
• An "integrated systems approach" should guide threat assessment inquiries and
investigations.
• The central question in a threat assessment inquiry or investigation is whether
a student
poses a threat, not whether the student has made a threat.
In addition, three elements guide the development and operation of an effective
school threat assessment program. These elements are:
• authority to conduct an assessment;
• capacity to conduct inquiries and investigations; and,
• systems relationships.
These principles and elements are discussed below.
Principles of the Threat Assessment Process
This Guide is about the systematic use of threat assessment as a central component
in pr
e
venting targeted school violence. The threat assessment process involves
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HREAT ASSESSMENT IN SCHOOLS GUIDE
identifying, assessing, and managing individuals who might pose a risk of violence to
an identified or identifiable target. Implementation of a threat assessment process is
informed by six underlying principles.
Principle 1: Targeted violence is the end result of an understandable, and oftentimes
discernible, process of thinking and behavior.
Findings of the Safe School Initiative indicate that students and former students who
committed targeted attacks at schools almost always thought about their attacks in
advance and did not "just snap" suddenly. These findings suggest that students who
carry out school attacks may consider possible targets; talk with others about their
ideas and intentions; and record their thinking in diaries and journals or on a Web
site. They may seek out weapons to use in the attack, and they may practice with
these weapons in preparation for the attack. The actions of these attackers may be
deliberate and occur over days and weeks, months or years.
Principle 2: Targeted violence stems from an interaction among the person, the
situation, the setting, and the target.
Understanding and preventing acts of targeted violence require a focus on these four
component parts and their interaction: the person, the situation, the setting, and the
target.
•
The potential attacker: To determine the risk of targeted violence, a threat
assessor must gather information about the potential attacker. In a threat
assessment inquiry or investigation, a major question is: How has this student
dealt with situations that have led him or her to see life as unbearably
stressful? Individuals who in times of great stress have considered or acted
upon ideas of suicide or violence toward others, or both, should be considered
persons of increased concern.
•
The situation: Investigators should examine circumstances and significant
events in the life of the individual, especially recent events that have been
overwhelmingly stressful. For students who engaged in school-based attacks,
those events included having been bullied and humiliated, especially in public;
loss of significant relationships; and perceived failures or loss of status.
Almost all school shooters experienced some major situational stress at some
point before their attack.
11
• The setting: The third factor to consider is the specific setting at the time that
t
he s
tudent came t
o aut
hor
ities’ attention as possibly posing a threat of
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HAPTER IV - IMPLEMENTING A SCHOOL THREAT ASSESSMENT PROCESS
31
targeted school violence. Do fellow students, friends, or others say–directly or
indirectly–that violence is not a solution to problems? Do these people
suggest ways to get help and assistance? In a school, are there respectful
connections among students and adults, networks of trusting relationships,
that facilitate non-violent problem-solving? Or is the idea of violence proposed,
supported, accepted, or ignored by those who know the potential attacker?
In many school shootings, other young persons knew about the shooter’s
interest in mounting an attack. In some cases, clear warnings were dismissed
or ignored. In others, friends and fellow students of the shooter encouraged
or helped the attacker in his pursuit of violence. Messages about the
acceptability of violence that are communicated directly or subtly to a potential
attacker by students and/or adults in his or her environment may facilitate, or
alternatively help to prevent, an attack.
•
The target: When assessing the risk of an attack at school, investigators and
others with protective responsibilities also must pay attention to the
individual’s choice of a potential target. The attacker may target a particular
individual or group of individuals over some perceived injury or loss. In some
cases, attackers chose a specific target, such as a particular student or teacher.
In other instances, the target was more general: the school itself, "jocks," or
"kids in the cafeteria."
Principle 3: An investigative, skeptical, inquisitive mindset is critical to successful
threat assessment.
An investigative mindset is central to successful application of the threat assessment
process. Threat assessment requires thoughtful probing; viewing information with
healthy skepticism; and paying attention to key points about pre-attack behaviors.
Authorities who carry out threat assessments must strive
to be both accurate and fair.
Moreover, threat assessors should question the
information in front of them continuously. Ideally, there
should be credible verification of all essential "facts."
Information about a potential attacker’s interests,
statements, and actions should be corroborated,
wherever possible.
The in
vestigative mindset and perspective also rely on
common sense. Threat assessors working to understand
a given situation should step back periodically from the
individual details of an inquiry or investigation and ask
whe
ther information gathered makes sense and supports
any hypothesis developed concerning the risk posed by
the subject of the threat assessment inquiry.
11
It should be emphasized again that many young people experience losses, failures, humiliations, and
other kinds of situational str
essors and that few become school shooters.
The investigative mindset and
perspective also rely on
common sense. Threat
assessors working to
understand a given situation
should step back periodically
from the individual details of
an inquiry or investigation
and ask whether information
gathered makes sense and
supports any hypothesis
developed concerning the
risk posed by the subject of
the threat assessment inquiry.
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HREAT ASSESSMENT IN SCHOOLS GUIDE
Principle 4: Effective threat assessment is based on facts rather than characteristics
or "traits."
A major principle of threat assessment is that each investigation stands on its own.
Inferences and conclusions about risk should be guided by an analysis of facts and
behaviors specific to the person of concern and the given situation. Any student with
the motive, intent, and ability potentially is capable of mounting a targeted attack at
school. Judgments about a student’s risk of violence should be based upon analysis
of behaviorally relevant facts, not on "traits" or "characteristics" of a given individual
or of a class of individuals.
In the climate of fear that followed recent attacks, students in high schools across the
country who appeared angry and wore trench coats were marked as possible school
attackers. They were so labeled because of appearance and demeanor. Blanket
characterizations, or student "profiles," do not provide a reliable basis for making
judgments of the threat posed by a particular student.
1
2
Even worse, the use of
profiles can shift attention away from more reliable facts and evidence about a
student’s behavior and communications.
Principle 5: An "integrated systems approach" should guide threat assessment
investigations.
In a threat assessment, bits of information might be viewed as pieces of a puzzle.
Each bit may appear inconsequential or only slightly worrisome by itself. But, when
the pieces are put together–as oftentimes has occurred in "after the fact" analyses of
school attacks–the behaviors and communications of a student may coalesce into a
discernible pattern that indicates a threat of violence. In many school attacks,
information existed within the school and community that might have alerted
authorities to the risk of attack posed by a particular student.
Relationships with agencies and service systems within the school and the
surrounding community are critical to identifying, assessing, and managing students
who are on a path toward carrying out a school attack. An integrated systems
approach recognizes the necessity of cooperation and partnerships between schools
and systems outside of the school. These may include law enforcement, social
services and mental health providers, the courts, community agencies, families,
worksites, religious organizations, and others.
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HAPTER IV - IMPLEMENTING A SCHOOL THREAT ASSESSMENT PROCESS
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Principle 6: The central question of a threat assessment is whether a student
poses
a
threat, not whether the student
made
a threat.
Although some individuals who threaten harm may pose a real threat of targeted
violence, many do not. The Safe School Initiative found that fewer than 20 percent of
school shooters communicated a direct or conditional threat to their target before the
attack. By contrast, individuals who are found to
pose threats of violence frequently
do not make threats to their targets. The study found that in more than 80 percent
of the cases, school shooters did not threaten their targets directly, but they did
communicate their intent and/or plans to others before the attack.
These findings underscore the importance of making
judgments in threat assessment investigations based upon a
student’s behaviors and communications, rather than upon
whether or not that student threatened his or her target.
Authorities conducting threat assessment investigations
must distinguish between
making a threat, e.g., telling a
potential target that he or she may or will be harmed, and
posing a threat, e.g., engaging in behavior that indicates
furthering a plan or building capacity for a violent act.
Nevertheless, threats of violence should not be dismissed
out of hand. Students may make threats with a variety of
intents and for a wide range of reasons, e.g., to get
attention; to express anger or frustration; to frighten or
coerce their peers; as a part of joking or "playing around;"
or, in some cases, to communicate intent to attack.
Consequently, every threat should receive prompt attention. Although voicing a
threat should not be used as the principal determinant in making judgments about
the likelihood of a school attack, it likewise would be a mistake to assume that
individuals who make threats in every instance are unlikely to follow through on
those communications.
Elements of a School Threat Assessment Process
Authorities involved in carrying out a threat assessment inquiry or investigation
should g
at
her and anal
yze information about the behavior and communications of
the student of concern. This information, in turn, will permit these authorities to
mak
e r
easonable judgments about whet
her t
he s
tudent of concern is moving along a
pat
h t
o
ward an attack on an identifiable target. Three elements are essential to the
de
velopment and operation of an effective school safety threat assessment program.
13
12
Please refer to Reddy, et. al. (2001), "Evaluating Risk for Targeted Violence in Schools: Comparing Risk
Assessment, Threat Assessment, and Other Approaches," for a discussion of the use and limitations of
pr
ofiling as a tool for assessing the risk of targeted school violence. The full citation for the article is
provided in the
Appendix, Annotated Resources, of this
Guide
.
13
See Chapter VII, Action Plans for School Leaders, for further guidance in cr
eating school
threat assessment programs.
Authorities conducting
threat assessment
investigations must
distinguish between
making a threat, e.g.,
telling a potential target
that he or she may or
will be harmed, and
posing a threat, e.g.,
engaging in behavior
that indicates furthering
a plan or building
capacity for a violent act.
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HREAT ASSESSMENT IN SCHOOLS GUIDE
1. Authority to Conduct an Assessment
A teacher comes to the principal’s office to report "the kids are saying that Johnny
told his friends not to go to the cafeteria at noon on Tuesday because something big
and bad is going to happen." What did Johnny mean by that statement? Is Johnny
planning to attack the school? Perhaps Johnny is engaging in idle talk. Perhaps the
report of Johnny’s statement is inaccurate. Perhaps Johnny is planning an attack on
the school or has knowledge about other students’ plans.
Clearly, this information cannot be ignored. How, then, should the principal respond
to this report? Should the principal call Johnny to the office and ask him about the
report? Should other students be queried about the report? What if Johnny denies
making the statement that has been reported, while other students assert otherwise?
Schools should have in place clear policies on collecting and reacting to information
on potentially threatening situations and determining whether this information merits
further attention through a threat assessment inquiry and investigation. Threat
assessment inquiry and investigation should be initiated if there is credible
information that passes a critical threshold of concern.
In creating these policies, school administrators should be aware of and consult with
the school’s legal counsel about legal issues related to the conduct of a threat
assessment inquiry or investigation. These legal issues include the effects of laws
pertaining to: (1) access to and sharing of information, and (2) searches of a
student’s person or property. Each of these issues should be discussed with the
school’s legal counsel.
Establishing Authority to Conduct an Inquiry or Investigation
A formal policy authorizing school officials to conduct a threat assessment should
cover the following topics:
• the purpose and scope of the policy;
• the role of educators and the threat assessment team in relation to the role of
law enforcement;
• the identity of, and delegation of authority to, school officials concerning
determination that a threat assessment inquiry or investigation should be
pursued;
• the definition of the threshold of concern for initiating a threat assessment
inquiry or investigation, i.e., a description of the nature and extent of behavior
or communication that would trigger a threat assessment inquiry or
investigation;
• the description of the types of information that may be gathered during the
assessment
;
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35
• the designation of the individuals or group of individuals who would be
responsible for gathering and analyzing information; and
• the steps and procedures to be followed from initiation to conclusion of the
threat assessment inquiry or investigation.
Information-Sharing in Support of the School Threat Assessment Process
Much emphasis in this Guide is placed upon the importance of sharing information
about a student who may pose a risk of violence. In most previous school shootings,
there was information available prior to the incident that suggested that the student
was planning an attack at school.
However, when conducting an inquiry or investigation regarding a potential threat,
the inquirer or investigator will find that different people in the student’s life may
have different–and possibly small–pieces of the puzzle. It is the responsibility of the
threat assessment team to gather this information from what may be multiple
sources–teachers, parents, friends, guidance counselors, after-school program staff,
part-time employers, and others.
Once information is gathered from the various sources contacted during a threat
assessment inquiry, the threat assessment team may wish to explore options for
storing this information in an accessible format. The team likewise may wish to
consider keeping the information in a central location.
Legal Considerations in Developing Information-Sharing Policies and Procedures
Although the need to gather information about a student who may pose a threat of
violence is clear, the ability to share this information requires some advance
consideration. Laws, rules, regulations, and policies, for example, may place
limitations on access to student records and restrict the use of accessible information
in conjunction with investigations. In formulating information-sharing policies and
procedures, threat assessment teams should consult with their respective school’s–or
school district’s–legal counsel to ensure that team members are well-briefed on
existing laws and regulations and their implications for the development of policies
and procedures for accessing and disclosing student information. In particular,
threat assessment teams should examine provisions of these laws and regulations to
identify opportunities for including threatening situations in schools as exceptions to
constraints on the disclosure of information contained in education records.
Two principal areas of law–federal statutes and state statutes–may affect access to
and shar
ing of inf
or
mation about a par
ticular s
tudent. An o
v
er
view of the
im
plications of t
hese ar
eas of la
w f
or conducting t
hr
eat assessment investigations is
pr
o
vided in the following.
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HREAT ASSESSMENT IN SCHOOLS GUIDE
Federal Statutes
Under existing federal law, a school’s authority to release information about a
student is governed by the Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act (FERPA).
14
The intent of FERPA is to protect the privacy of "education records," a term that is
defined as any records that contain information directly related to a student and that
are maintained by the educational agency or institution or by a person acting for the
agency or institution. Under provisions of FERPA, a school may not disclose
personally identifiable information about a student from any education records
without the prior written consent of the student’s parent or, in the case of students
who are 18 or older, the consent of the student.
FERPA does allow for various exceptions to privacy protections covering access to
student records, specifying situations and conditions under which a school may
disclose information from a student’s education records without consent. A detailed
analysis of these exceptions is beyond the scope of this Guide. However, there are
two exceptions that are worth noting because of their specific relevance to accessing
and sharing information for threat assessment inquiries:
•
Health and Safety Emergencies: FERPA provides that schools may disclose
information from a student’s education records in situations where there is an
immediate need to share that information in order to protect the health or
safety of the student or others.
1
5
Under this exception, schools must define the
term "health or safety emergency" narrowly and are permitted to disclose
information from education records only to those individuals who need the
information in order to protect the student and others.
•
Law Enforcement Unit Records: FERPA regulations draw a distinction between
records created by a school law enforcement unit for law enforcement
purposes, such as the enforcement of a local, state, or federal law, and records
created by a school law enforcement unit for non-law enforcement purposes,
such as the enforcement of school policies concerning behavior or disciplinary
actions. FERPA also distinguishes between student information that school
law enforcement unit officials gathered from education records and student
information that unit officials obtained from other sources. With respect to
disclosure of student information contained in school law enforcement unit
records, FERPA provides that:
- Personally identifiable information about a student may be disclosed by
school officials if that information is held in a school law enforcement unit
record that was created to enforce a federal, state, or local law.
- Information in school law enforcement unit records that was not obtained
fr
om a s
tudent
’
s education r
ecor
ds ma
y also be disclosed wit
hout the
consent of t
he s
tudent
’
s par
ents or the student.
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37
It is important to note that FERPA regulations govern the disclosure of student
information from education records and any information about the student that is
based upon information contained in education records. FERPA regulations do not
restrict the authority of school officials to share other information about a student
that
is not contained in education records. For example, information such as a
school official’s personal observations about or interactions with a student that is not
contained in education records may be disclosed.
State Law and Access to Student Records
State laws governing access to and sharing of information about students vary from
state to state. Moreover, in the wake of highly publicized school shootings in the
1990s, several states enacted laws that revise restrictions on disclosure of
information contained in student records. In some states, these amendments, in
effect, make it easier to share this information among schools, law enforcement
agencies, and others in furtherance of protecting the safety of students at school.
1
6
2. Capacity to Conduct Inquiries and Investigations
Proactive planning is a critical element in the implementation of a school threat
assessment program. School administrators should consider creating a
multidisciplinary threat assessment team that is based in the school or the school
district. Schools should not wait until a crisis occurs to establish a threat assessment
team. Many schools across the country already have established teams to respond to
a wide range of situations, from suicides to meeting special education needs. The
expertise and knowledge of any existing teams may be useful in developing a threat
assessment team.
The roles and responsibilities of the team as a whole, and of members of that team
individually, should be clearly defined. The information gathering and assessment
procedures to be used by the team should be formalized. Team members should be
trained together in the threat assessment process. Multidisciplinary training sessions
provide opportunities for professionals in different systems to build relationships and
to consider how to address issues before a crisis arises. Training that uses practical
exercises–"what should we do if …"–can enhance threat assessment and management
programs and processes.
The multidisciplinary t
hr
eat assessment t
eam’
s principal responsibility is to guide the
assessment and manag
ement of situations of concern. A senior school administrator
should chair the team. Regular members of the team ideally should include: 1) a
r
espect
ed member of t
he school f
aculty or adminis
tration; 2) an investigator, such as
14
20 U.S. C. 1232g. See "Information Sharing" in the Appendix, Annotated Resources, of the
Guide
for referral to additional sources of information on FERPA.
15
34 CFR 99.31(a)(10).
16
See "Information Sharing" in the Appendix, Annotated Resources, of the
Guide
for references
that r
eview some of the more recent changes to state laws that affect access to and disclosure of student
information contained in education records.
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HREAT ASSESSMENT IN SCHOOLS GUIDE
a school resource officer or other police officer assigned to the school; 3) a mental
health professional, such as a forensic psychologist, a clinical psychologist, or a
school psychologist; and 4) other professionals, such as guidance counselors,
teachers, coaches, and others, who may be able to contribute to the threat
assessment process.
In addition, the chair of the threat assessment team may wish to consider including
as an ad hoc member of the team someone who knows the student of concern in the
threat assessment inquiry. This ad hoc position might be held by an individual from
the school community, such as a teacher, counselor, coach, nurse, other school
employee, or someone from the community who may know or have knowledge of the
student, such as a probation officer, member of the clergy, or a social service worker.
If the student of concern is being provided services under the Individuals with
Disabilities in Education Act (IDEA), a representative from the team that developed
or manages that student’s Individualized Education Plan (IEP) also should be
brought onto the threat assessment team as an ad hoc member for the inquiry
regarding this particular student.
Skills and Training
Developing the capacity to conduct school threat assessments involves recruiting,
training, and supporting professionals with special skills. The qualifications, skills,
knowledge and experience of the members of the threat assessment team should
include:
• a questioning, analytical, and skeptical mindset;
• an ability to relate well to parents, colleagues, other professionals, and
students;
• familiarity with childhood and adolescent growth and development, the school
environment, the need for safe schools, and the community;
• a reputation within the school and the community for fairness and
trustworthiness;
• training in the collection and evaluation of information from multiple sources;
• discretion, and an appreciation for the importance of keeping information
confidential, and of the possible harm that may result in the inappropriate
release of information; and
• cognizance of the difference between harming and helping in an intervention.
3. Integrated Systems Relationships
In order to identify, assess, and manage students who might pose threats of targeted
violence, a threat assessment program must build relationships among individuals
and or
g
anizations both within the school and external to the school. These
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HAPTER IV - IMPLEMENTING A SCHOOL THREAT ASSESSMENT PROCESS
39
relationships can help the team acquire and use information about a given situation,
and aid those with protective responsibilities in developing strategies to prevent
targeted school violence.
Ideally, community systems concerned with education, safety, and child welfare
would have well-established policies and procedures for cooperation and
collaboration. In practice, these systems oftentimes are large and overburdened and
tend to carry out their functions independently. In a well-functioning threat
assessment program, effective systems relationships are most likely to occur between
individuals, not institutions.
Individuals who build and maintain these relationships across disciplines and
agencies are called "boundary spanners."
17
They serve as a formal link or liaison
between various systems and meet regularly with them. Boundary spanners have
credibility, respect, and strong interpersonal skills. In addition, they should
understand the needs and operation of other systems. This understanding helps in
integrating ongoing interagency relationships, in developing written protocols, and in
facilitating the resolution of conflicts.
17
Steadman, H., "Boundar
y Spanners: A Key Component for the Effective Interactions of the Justice and
Mental Health Systems." Law and Human Behavior
. 16 (Februar
y
, 1992): 75-87.
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HREAT ASSESSMENT IN SCHOOLS GUIDE
40
C
HAPTER V - CONDUCTING AN ASSESSMENT
CHAPTER V
CONDUCTING A
SCHOOL THREAT
ASSESSMENT
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HAPTER V - CONDUCTING A SCHOOL THREAT ASSESSMENT
43
This chapter focuses specifically on carrying out the threat assessment process. The
sections that follow address the issue of identifying threatening situations; describe
the information that should be sought in a threat assessment; identify potential
sources of information; and set out 11 key questions that may provide members of
the threat assessment team guidance in making judgments about whether a student
of concern poses a threat.
The approach presented is highly detailed but should not be read as suggesting that
most, or even many, threat assessments will require extensive or elaborate gathering
and analysis of information. Threat assessments may be brief and limited, or
extensive and complex. The facts of a situation, together with information developed
about a student of concern, will determine the scope of the threat assessment
process. Many situations can be understood and resolved after initial information-
gathering and evaluation.
The Threat Assessment Process as a Continuum
In previous chapters of this Guide, the terms "threat assessment inquiry" and "threat
assessment investigation" generally have been used interchangeably. In this chapter,
threat assessment inquiries and threat assessment investigations will be addressed as
two complementary parts of a threat assessment continuum. Under this model of the
threat assessment process, evaluation of a threatening situation proceeds from a
threat assessment
inquiry, carried out by the school threat assessment team, to a
threat assessment
investigation, carried out by a law enforcement agency, if the initial
inquiry determines that there is a valid threat of targeted school violence.
There may be several "right ways" to designate responsibility for conducting a threat
assessment. One community or school system may decide to give primary
responsibility to specially trained law enforcement professionals. Another may keep
responsibility for most threat assessment and management within the school system.
Still other communities develop "blended" systems. School, law enforcement, and
community leaders should consider the principles of threat assessment, the functions
needed for a successful program, and local resources and relationships before
deciding what delineation of responsibilities makes the most sense.
The threat assessment process is being presented in this manner as a means of
underscoring the proposition that not all situations that become the focus of school
threat assessment inquiries will require referral to and follow-up threat assessment
investigations by law enforcement officials. For example, some preliminary inquiries
by members of the school threat assessment team will find that information about a
student was false or unfounded, or that the behavior of the student who is the subject
of this inquiry does not present a risk of targeted violence and can be managed by
school administrators and other officials on an informal basis. The situations
e
x
amined in these inquiries do not pose threats to the school, the student body, or
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HREAT ASSESSMENT IN SCHOOLS GUIDE
the community, and therefore generally would not be referred to law enforcement
agencies. By contrast, threat assessment inquiries that conclude that a valid threat of
targeted school violence exists will require referral to law enforcement officials for
further investigation.
Central Distinctions Between Threat Assessment Inquiries and Investigations
The central distinctions between a threat assessment
inquiry and a threat assessment investigation are defined
by the management of these two parts of the threat
assessment continuum. The primary objective of both a
threat assessment inquiry and an investigation is to
determine whether a particular student poses a threat of
targeted school violence. Both an inquiry and an
investigation ask "Is there information to suggest that this
student is on the path to an attack? What is the risk of
targeted violence?"
A threat assessment inquiry is initiated and controlled by school authorities (often
with law enforcement consultation and participation). Information is gathered at the
school and by persons known to the school. If information collected suggests that the
student of concern is considering mounting an attack at school, it may be
appropriate to refer the situation to law enforcement for an investigation. Also, if
information gathered in a threat assessment inquiry suggests that it is likely that a
violation of law has occurred, it may be appropriate to refer the situation to law
enforcement.
A threat assessment investigation also asks: "Does this student pose a threat of
targeted violence?" In addition, investigators may ask: "Has this student violated a
law?"
With respect to their management, the threat assessment inquiry and the threat
assessment investigation differ as follows:
• threat assessment inquiries are initiated, conducted, and controlled by the
school threat assessment team;
• threat assessment investigations are initiated, conducted, and controlled by law
enforcement agencies.
The line between a threat assessment inquiry and a threat assessment
investigation–the point along the threat assessment continuum at which a school
threat assessment team decides that a threatening situation must be referred to a law
enforcement agency for investigation–will be determined by the school threat
assessment team in consultation with school administrators and law enforcement
officials. These determinations, in turn, will be made on a case-by-case basis.
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HAPTER V - CONDUCTING A SCHOOL THREAT ASSESSMENT
45
Nevertheless, in developing policies and procedures for carrying out a threat
assessment inquiry, the threat assessment program should establish a general
threshold for initiating inquiries and referring threatening situations to law
enforcement agencies.
Identifying Students of Concern
As discussion of the threat assessment process in this Guide indicates, that process is
not about the wholesale examination of the student body to identify students who
may be at risk of committing acts of targeted school violence. Instead, threat
assessment is a tool for responding to threatening situations in which there is
concern about a particular student who has come to the attention of school
administrators or other authorities.
Students who become the focus of threat assessment inquiries and investigations may
come to the attention of authorities in a number of ways.
Circumstances That Bring a Student to Official Attention
Some students may bring themselves to the attention of authorities by engaging in
communications that cause concern:
• A student submits a story for an English assignment about a character that
shoots other students in his school.
• Two students in a video class make a movie about kids who bring bombs to
school.
• A dean receives an e-mail stating, "I’m going to kill everyone in this asylum."
• A seventh-grader, who is known to be feared by his classmates, cocks a finger
at another boy on the playground and says "you’re gonna die."
• The personal Web page of a high-achieving student has links to Web pages
with information about cyanide.
In each of the situations described above, a student has behaved in a manner that
causes concern to school administrators and other authorities. Each situation
requires some kind of follow-up inquiry or investigation. In each case, the identity of
the student is known or potentially knowable. In some cases, the student’s
communication is a direct threat. In other cases, the communication is ambiguous.
Other students of concern come to the attention of authorities through second or
third parties:
• A school bus dr
iver tells the principal of a school that a group of students has
been overheard whispering about bringing a gun to school.
• A ninth-grader reports that he has been threatened by another student and
w
ar
ned no
t to tell anybody about the threat.
The primary objective of
both a threat assessment
inquiry and an
investigation is to
determine whether a
particular student poses
a threat of targeted
school violence.
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HREAT ASSESSMENT IN SCHOOLS GUIDE
• A student reports overhearing a lunchroom conversation between two other
students in which one of the students says that he "isn’t going to take it any
more. I’m going to get even for good."
• A neighbor of a student calls the school to report suspicions that the student is
experimenting with bomb-making materials.
In still other cases, students come to the attention of authorities through anonymous
communications:
• A parent anonymously calls a tip line to report concerns about the behavior of
a student.
• The school district superintendent’s office receives an anonymous call stating
that a bomb will go off in one of the middle schools at 1:45 p.m.
• An anonymous letter signed "Fans of Eric and Dylan Club" arrives at a high
school. The letter states "Remember Columbine" and warns that "Judgment
Day" is coming.
Information provided anonymously requires careful evaluation by the school threat
assessment team. Some information may be accurate. Some information may be
partial or incomplete. Some may be false and/or fabricated with malicious intent.
In situations where a student is not easily identifiable from an anonymous
communication, more sophisticated identification techniques may be required.
These methods and techniques may necessitate involvement of law enforcement
organizations, particularly in situations where there are anonymous warnings of
imminent danger, such as bomb threats.
Managing Communications about Students of Concern
Policies regarding the handling of communications that raise concerns about students
should address the following topics:
• Establishing low barriers for reporting for those who may have information of
concern.
1
8
• Advising students and adults of the kinds of information that should be
brought f
orward: threats; weapon-seeking and weapon-using behavior;
homicidal and suicidal behaviors; behaviors suggesting that a young person is
contemplating, or planning, an attack.
• Ensuring that a thoughtful process is put in place in the school or school
district to assess information that is brought forward about a potential
attacker. This process should be perceived as credible by students and adults.
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• Recognizing that what is reported may often be different than what actually
was said or occurred.
• Establishing and continually reinforcing a policy that it is everyone’s
responsibility to help develop and maintain a respectful, safe school
environment.
• Reinforcing positive behaviors by teachers, students, and staff in the school.
• Building linkages to individuals, groups, and organizations that can offer
support and assistance to students and to the school. Sometimes these
persons and groups may provide information that can help prevent targeted
violent attacks.
Creating a Central Point of Contact
Individuals who have information about students that is cause for concern should
know how to refer this information and to whom. The threat assessment team
should designate a member of the team to serve as the initial point of contact for
information of possible concern. The availability of this point of contact should be
made known community-wide. An anonymous tip line may be of use if there is a
process in place to carefully evaluate the information that is received by means of this
approach. The threat assessment team member who serves as initial point of contact
will screen information and determine whether to initiate a threat assessment inquiry
or to consult other members of the team.
Schools should publicize the name of the designated point of contact to faculty, staff,
parents, and students as the person to contact with any information of potential
concern. Students, faculty, staff, and parents should be instructed and encouraged to
bring forward information about any activity that evokes concern about possible
targeted violence. Information of interest includes threatening statements and
writings; behavior that indicates that an attack is being planned; and attempts to
acquire weapons.
Individuals who provide information concerning a student should receive follow-up
acknowledgments of their communications from the central point of contact, such as:
"We have carefully considered the information you shared with us" or "We appreciate
your bringing this situation to our attention." A follow-up acknowledgment can be
made without revealing confidential or inappropriate information, and it reinforces
the proposition that individuals in the community can play an important role in
alerting school officials and other authorities of suspected threatening situations.
The Threat Assessment Inquiry
This section descr
ibes t
he pr
ocess f
or conducting a t
hreat assessment inquiry. The
information developed during the inquiry will inform the threat assessment team’s
analysis of a potentially threatening situation and provide the basis for deciding
whether that situation should be referred to a law enforcement agency for a threat
assessment in
v
es
tigation.
18
There is a growing body of literature on lowering barriers for persons with concerns and on integrated
conflict management systems that may be of interest to school administrators. See for example Designing
Integrated Conflict Management Systems: Guidelines for Practitioners and Decision Makers in Organizations,
Society of Professionals in Dispute Resolution, 2001, http://www.spidr.org/article/icmsD.html
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HREAT ASSESSMENT IN SCHOOLS GUIDE
In the event that a threatening situation is referred to a law enforcement agency, the
information gathered and analyzed by the threat assessment team during the threat
assessment inquiry will be forwarded to the investigative law enforcement agency.
That information will provide direction to police officials’ more in-depth examination
of the behaviors and communications of the student of concern.
When should a threat assessment inquiry be initiated?
When information about a student’s behavior and
communications passes an agreed-upon threshold of
concern, school officials should initiate a threat
assessment inquiry. Upon receiving information
concerning a potentially threatening situation, the threat
assessment team must first consider: "How much time do
we have?" An inquiry should be initiated immediately
(within hours of notification) in any situation of concern.
If information concerning a threatening situation suggests
that violence is imminent–for example, a student has
acquired a weapon and is on his way to the school with
the intention of shooting another student–that matter of
course should be referred immediately to police.
When information is received concerning a potentially threatening situation, the
safety of the school and the community is the priority consideration. The threat
assessment team therefore should consider how to handle a student of concern while
an inquiry or investigation is being conducted. In making decisions about how to
handle a student pending the outcome of a threat assessment inquiry or investigation,
care should be exercised to ensure that a student of concern is not treated
inappropriately, since any allegations regarding the behavior or perceived
dangerousness of the student may be unfounded.
What information should be sought in an inquiry?
Once a decision has been made to conduct an inquiry, the threat assessment team
should develop an information plan. A school threat assessment inquiry should seek
information in five areas:
1
. The f
acts t
hat dre
w attention to the student, the situation, and possibly the targets
The f
ir
s
t ar
ea of inq
uir
y concer
ns how the student came to the attention of school
of
f
icials. What beha
vior
s and/or communications were reported, and by whom?
What was the situation? Who, if anyone, witnessed the reported behavior of
concern? What was the context for the reported behavior, i.e., what else was going
on at the time of the reported behavior?
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Individuals who report information about possible threatening situations may have
multiple motives. Alleged accounts of behaviors may be inaccurate and may be
subjective interpretations of events. Careful attention to the facts–with
corroboration wherever possible–will help determine whether the situation warrants
scrutiny.
2. Information about the student
Three kinds of general information about a student should be gathered: identifiers,
background information, and information about the student’s current life situation
and circumstances.
A. Identifying information:
• name;
• physical description;
• date of birth; and
• identification numbers (e.g., Social Security number, student ID, etc.).
B. Background information:
• residences;
• family/home situation;
• academic performance;
• social networks;
• history of relationships and conflicts;
• history of harassing others or of being harassed by others;
• history of violence toward self and others;
• history of having been a victim of violence or bullying;
• known attitudes toward violence;
• criminal behavior;
• mental health/substance abuse history;
• access to and use of weapons; and
• history of grievances and grudges.
C. Current life information:
• present stability of living and home situations;
• nature and quality of current relationships and personal support;
• recent losses or losses of status (shame, humiliation, recent breakup or loss of
significant relationship);
• current grievances or grudges;
• perceptions of being treated unfairly;
• known difficulty coping with a stressful event;
• any "downward" progression in social, academic, behavioral, or psychological
functioning;
Upon receiving
information concerning
a potentially threatening
situation, the threat
assessment team must
first consider: "How
much time do we
have?" An inquiry
should be initiated
immediately (within
hours of notification) in
any situation of concern.
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HREAT ASSESSMENT IN SCHOOLS GUIDE
• recent hopelessness, desperation, and/or despair, including suicidal thoughts,
gestures, actions, or attempts; and
• pending crises or change in circumstances.
Of particular note is whether the student has any trusting relationships with adults
who are emotionally available to him or her, or whether the student is known to be
consistently respectful to any adult. If there is an adult who is "connected" to the
student, that adult may have useful information about the student’s thinking and
behavior. In addition, such an adult may be able to help the student if he or she
appears to be on a path toward mounting a targeted school attack.
3. Information about "attack-related" behaviors
Examination of the thinking and behaviors of school shooters suggests that most
attacks are preceded by discernible behaviors, as the student plans or prepares for
the attack. These behaviors are referred to as “attack-related behaviors. “
Behaviors that should raise concern about potential violence include:
• ideas or plans about injuring him/herself or attacking a school or persons at
school;
• communications or writings that suggest that the student has an unusual or
worrisome interest in school attacks;
• comments that express or imply the student is considering mounting an attack
at school;
• recent weapon-seeking behavior, especially if weapon-seeking is linked to ideas
about attack or expressions about interest in attack;
• communications or writings suggesting the student condones or is considering
violence to redress a grievance or solve a problem; and
• rehearsals of attacks or ambushes.
4. Motives
Motives for actual school attacks have included:
• revenge for a perceived injury or grievance;
• yearning for attention, recognition, or notoriety;
• a wish to solve a problem otherwise seen as unbearable; and
• a desire to die or be killed.
Knowledge of the motives of a student of concern may help the threat assessment
team in evaluating the risk of targeted violence. Understanding the circumstances
that may have prompted a student to consider attacking others may permit
authorities to direct the student away from violence.
50
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51
For example, a student who feels he has been treated wrongly and unfairly by a
teacher or an administrator and who is thinking about "revenge" may be offered or
taught non-violent ways to address his concerns and problems. Mediation; personal
support; clarification about the disciplinary process; education about how to write a
letter of concern to authorities who might intervene in the student’s problems; or
other dispute resolution efforts might turn that student away from a potentially
violent course of action. A student who is suicidal and who wants to get "even" with
his bullies before ending his life may be provided mental health services and support.
In addition, school administrators should intervene on this student’s behalf to stop
the bullying.
As stated in previous chapters of this
Guide, students make threats and engage in
other risky behaviors for a range of reasons. Many threatening statements and
actions do not reflect the student’s actual movement on a path to attack.
Adolescents occasionally say and do "outrageous" things, so a single utterance or
action should not be seen as determinative in a threat assessment.
1
9
5. Target selection
Most school shooters identified their targets to friends and fellow students before
advancing the attack. Almost half of school shooters had more than one target.
Threat assessors should consider whether and how a potential attacker’s interest in a
target may shift to another target over time. Information about a student’s targets
may provide clues to the student’s motives, planning, and attack-related behaviors.
Information about the student’s motives also may inform the question of whether
there are additional targets.
What are sources of information for the inquiry?
1. School information
A school threat assessment inquiry should begin with what is known about the
student from records, teacher interviews, and other information easily accessed at
the school and from school officials. In utilizing information from school records in
a threat assessment inquiry, the threat assessment team should follow school policies
and relevant laws regarding information-sharing.
20
Answers to the following questions may be drawn from information at school:
• Is the student well known to any adult at the school?
19
Please note that all comments and behaviors should be understood in their context: the words "get him"
may have very different meanings at a football game when linemen are chasing the quarterback than in a
hallway after a student has been bullied and tormented.
20
See Chapter IV of this
Guide
for a more in-depth discussion of the issue of information-sharing.
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HREAT ASSESSMENT IN SCHOOLS GUIDE
• Has the student come to attention for any behavior of concern? If so, what? (e-
mail, Web site, posters, papers, rule-breaking, violence, harassment,
adjustment problems, depression or despair, acting-out behavior, etc.)
• Has the student experienced serious difficulties or been in distress?
• Is there anyone with whom the student shares worries, frustrations, and/or
sorrows?
• Is there information that the student has considered ending his or her life?
• Has the student been a victim and/or an initiator of hostile, harassing, or
bullying behavior directed toward other students, teachers, or other staff?
• Is the student known to have an interest in weapons? If so, has he or she made
efforts to acquire or use weapons? Does the student live in a home in which
there are weapons (whether or not the weapons are secured)?
2. Collateral school interviews
Students and adults who know the student who is the subject of the threat
assessment inquiry should be asked about communications or other behaviors that
may indicate the student of concern’s ideas or intent. The focus of these interviews
should be factual:
• What was said? To whom?
• What was written? To whom?
• What was done?
• When and where did this occur?
• Who else observed this behavior?
• Did the student say why he or she acted as they did?
Bystanders, observers, and other people who were there when the student engaged
in threatening behaviors or made threatening statements should be queried about
whether any of these behaviors or statements concerned or worried them. These
individuals should be asked about changes in the student’s attitudes and behaviors.
Likewise, they should be asked if they have become increasingly concerned about the
student’s behavior or state of mind.
However, individuals interviewed generally should not be asked to characterize the
student or interpret meanings of communications that the student may have made.
Statements such as "I think he’s really dangerous" or "he said it with a smile, so I
knew that he must be joking" may not be accurate characterizations of the student’s
intent, and therefore are unlikely to be useful to the threat assessment team in
carrying out a threat assessment inquiry.
3. Parent/guardian interview
The parents or guardians of the student of concern usually should be interviewed.
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Parents may be protective of their children. They may be frightened and/or
embarrassed about the inquiry and the possibility that their child may be
contemplating a violent act. The threat assessment team therefore should make it
clear to the student’s parents or guardians that the objective of the threat assessment
inquiry is not only to help prevent targeted school violence and diminish the chance
that the student and possibly others would be harmed, but also to help their child.
The threat assessment team should seek the help of the student’s parents in
understanding the student’s actions and interests, recognizing that parents may or
may not know much about their child’s thinking and behavior. Questions for parents
should focus on the student’s behaviors and communications, especially those that
might be attack-related. The student’s interest in weapons should be explored, as well
as his or her access to weapons at home.
It may be useful for a member of the threat assessment team to visit and observe the
student of concern’s home. The threat assessment team should have policies and
procedures in place regarding home visits.
4. Interviews with the student of concern
Interviews with a student of concern oftentimes are critical in a threat assessment
inquiry. School administrators and law enforcement officials and their respective
legal counsels should follow existing policies or develop policies regarding interviews
with students of concern. Issues that should be considered include:
• If and when to notify parents/guardians of an interview;
• Whether or when to invite parents/guardians to be present during an
interview;
• Whether and how to use information from an interview for criminal justice
proceedings; and
• Whether and when legal representation should be allowed, offered, or
provided.
State and local laws differ with respect to requirements regarding these questions.
In some instances, the threat assessment team may determine that important
information might be obtained through a search of a student’s person or property, or
the property of another individual to which the student has access. The search of a
student in any context is a sensitive and legally complex issue that should be
examined thoroughly by school administrators and their legal counsel and addressed
in policies and procedures governing the conduct of a threat assessment inquiry.
21
21
The U.S. Supreme Court has established that Fourth Amendment protections against unreasonable
search and seizure apply to students on school property, but the court has recognized school officials’
authority to conduct sear
ches that ar
e r
easonable (
New Jersey v. T.L.O.
).
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HREAT ASSESSMENT IN SCHOOLS GUIDE
The primary purpose of a student interview is to learn about the student’s thinking,
motives, and behavior. The tone of the interview should be professional, neutral, and
non-confrontational, rather than accusatory or judgmental.
Before conducting an interview with a student of concern, the threat assessment
team should be well-acquainted with the facts that brought the student to the
attention of school administrators and others. In addition, prior to conducting the
student interview, the threat assessment team should have reviewed available
information concerning the student’s background, interests, and behaviors.
Background information can inform the threat assessment team’s approach to and
questioning of the student. This information may help the threat assessment team
determine whether the student poses a threat to particular targets. In addition,
knowledge of background information concerning the student prior to the interview
may help the threat assessment team judge whether the student is forthcoming and
straightforward. Generally, a student should be asked directly about his or her
intentions. Often, adolescents will respond forthrightly to a direct question.
A student interview conducted during a threat assessment inquiry can elicit
important information that permits the threat assessment team to better understand
the situation of the student and possible targets. This understanding, in turn, will
help the threat assessment team to assess the risk of violence that the student may
pose in a given situation. Interviews with a student of concern also can generate
leads for further inquiry.
An interview can also send the message to the student that his or her behavior has
been noticed and has caused concern. Interviews give students of concern the
opportunity to tell their personal stories, to be heard, and to reassess and redirect
their behavior away from activities that are of concern. The interview may suggest to
a student who has mixed feelings about attacking that there are people who are
interested in his or her welfare, and that there are better, more effective ways to deal
with problems or with specific people.
Although an interview with a student of concern can provide valuable information,
relying too heavily on that interview as a basis for making judgments about whether
that student poses a threat may present problems. The information offered by the
student may be incomplete, misleading, or inaccurate. It therefore is important to
collect information to corroborate and verify information learned from the student
interview.
5. Potential target interview
Individuals who ha
v
e been identif
ied as potential targets of the student of concern
also should be interviewed. The threat assessment team should inform the subject of
the interview that the primary purpose of that interview is to gather information
about a possible situation of concer
n.
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A potential target should be asked about their relationship to the student of concern
and queried about recent interactions with that student. The interviewer should
gather information about grievances and grudges that the student of concern may
hold against a target or against others.
Interviews with potential targets should be conducted with special sensitivity. Care
must be taken to gather information without unduly alarming a potential target. If
the threat assessment team believes that there may be a risk of violence to an
identified target, that target should be offered assistance and support.
How should information be organized and analyzed?
Information gathered in a threat assessment inquiry should be examined for evidence
of behavior and conditions that suggest that the student of concern is planning and
preparing for an attack. Analysis of this information should, in the end, answer these
questions: Is the behavior of the student consistent with movement on a pathway
toward attack? Do the student’s current situation and setting incline him or her
toward or away from targeted violence?
Evaluation of information gathered from research and interviews conducted during a
threat assessment inquiry should be guided by the following 11 key questions:
1. What are the student’s motive(s) and goals?
• What motivated the student to make the statements or take the actions that
caused him or her to come to attention?
• Does the situation or circumstance that led to these statements or actions still
exist?
• Does the student have a major grievance or grudge? Against whom?
• What efforts have been made to resolve the problem and what has been the
result? Does the potential attacker feel that any part of the problem is resolved
or see any alternatives?
2. Have there been any communications suggesting ideas or intent to attack?
• What, if anything, has the student communicated to someone else (targets,
friends, other students, teachers, family, others) or written in a diary, journal,
or Web site concerning his or her ideas and/or intentions?
• Have friends been alerted or "warned away"?
3. Has the subject shown inappropriate interest in any of the following?
• school attacks or attackers;
• weapons (including recent acquisition of any relevant weapon); or
• incidents of mass violence (terrorism, workplace violence, mass murderers).
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HREAT ASSESSMENT IN SCHOOLS GUIDE
4. Has the student engaged in attack-related behaviors? These behaviors might
include:
• developing an attack idea or plan;
• making efforts to acquire or practice with weapons;
• casing, or checking out, possible sites and areas for attack; or
• rehearsing attacks or ambushes.
5. Does the student have the
capacity
to carry out an act of targeted violence?
• How organized is the student’s thinking and behavior?
• Does the student have the means, e.g., access to a weapon, to carry out an
attack?
6. Is the student experiencing hopelessness, desperation, and/or despair?
• Is there information to suggest that the student is experiencing desperation
and/or despair?
• Has the student experienced a recent failure, loss and/or loss of status?
• Is the student known to be having difficulty coping with a stressful event?
• Is the student now, or has the student ever been, suicidal or "accident-prone"?
Has the student engaged in behavior that suggests that he or she has
considered ending his or her life?
7. Does the student have a trusting relationship with at least one responsible adult?
• Does the student have at least one relationship with an adult where the student
feels that he or she can confide in the adult and believes that the adult will
listen without judging or jumping to conclusions? (Students with trusting
relationships with adults may be directed away from violence and despair and
toward hope.)
• Is the student emotionally connected to–or disconnected from–other students?
• Has the student previously come to someone’s attention or raised concern in a
way that suggested he or she needs intervention or supportive services?
8. Does the student see violence as an acceptable–or desirable–or the only–way to
solv
e problems?
• Does the setting around the student (friends, fellow students, parents, teachers,
adults) explicitly or implicitly support or endorse violence as a way of resolving
problems or disputes?
• Has the student been "dared" by others to engage in an act of violence?
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9. Is the student’s conversation and "story" consistent with his or her actions?
• Does information from collateral interviews and from the student’s own
behavior confirm or dispute what the student says is going on?
10. Are other people concerned about the student’s potential for violence?
• Are those who know the student concerned that he or she might take action
based on violent ideas or plans?
• Are those who know the student concerned about a specific target?
• Have those who know the student witnessed recent changes or escalations in
mood and behavior?
11. What circumstances might affect the likelihood of an attack?
• What factors in the student’s life and/or environment might increase or
decrease the likelihood that the student will attempt to mount an attack at
school?
• What is the response of other persons who know about the student’s ideas or
plan to mount an attack? (Do those who know about the student’s ideas
actively discourage the student from acting violently, encourage the student to
attack, deny the possibility of violence, passively collude with an attack, etc.?)
Thoughtful consideration of the answers to the above 11 questions will produce a
sound foundation for the threat assessment team’s response to the overarching
question in a threat assessment inquiry: Does the student of concern pose a threat of
targeted violence at school? If the threat assessment team concludes that:
a. there is enough reliable information to answer the 11 key questions; and
b. the weight of the information is convincing that the student does not pose a threat
of targeted school violence; then
c. the threat assessment team may conclude the threat assessment inquiry.
The threat assessment team may determine that closure of the inquiry is warranted,
but conclude that the student, or previously suggested targets, need help coping with
the behavior or problems that initially brought the threatening situation to the
attention of authorities. In such situations, the team should work with school
administrators and others to ensure that these individuals receive the assistance and
continued support that they may need.
For example, if the student who was the focus of the threat assessment inquiry came
t
o t
he attention of authorities because of behavior or communications that suggested
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HREAT ASSESSMENT IN SCHOOLS GUIDE
that he or she was contemplating suicide, that student should be offered–and
receive–appropriate counseling or other services. Likewise, if the threat assessment
team concludes that the student was a victim of false allegations, the team may wish
to consider recommending actions to deal with malicious accusers.
Regardless of the outcome of the threat assessment inquiry, the threat assessment
team should document carefully the inquiry and any actions taken. This
documentation should be carried out in compliance with any applicable school or
other relevant policies and/or legal considerations, and should include a record of
the sources of, and content for, all key information considered in the threat
assessment as well as the date that the information was acquired. In addition to
documenting the facts that provided the basis for the findings in the threat
assessment inquiry, it also is important to document the reasoning that led the threat
assessment team to its decision in that inquiry.
If the team concludes that
a. there is insufficient information for the threat assessment team to be reasonably
certain that the student does not pose a threat; or
b. the student appears to be on a path to attack; then
c. the team should recommend that the matter be referred to the appropriate law
enforcement agency for a threat assessment investigation.
The Threat Assessment Investigation
As explained earlier in this chapter, the focus of a threat assessment investigation–the
information sought and questions asked–will be similar to that of a threat assessment
inquiry. However, the scope of the threat assessment investigation’s collection and
analysis of information will be broader than in an inquiry, reaching outside the
school and across systems within the community.
In carrying out a threat assessment investigation, investigators should explore a
student’s prior contacts with civil authorities and criminal and juvenile justice
officials. These investigators may re-interview, in greater depth, individuals contacted
dur
ing the threat assessment inquiry, such as a student’s family members; fellow
s
tudents and fr
iends; neighbor
s; and em
plo
yers. Investigators will focus particularly
on attack-related behaviors exhibited by the student, including efforts to acquire, buy,
or gain access to weapons.
In
v
estigators also may request the permission of the student or his parents to search
a student’s computer, room, home, car, or workspace. In some cases, investigators
may seek to obtain search warrants.
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Investigators should evaluate information gathered during a threat assessment
investigation in accord with the 11 key questions identified in the above discussion of
procedures for conducting a threat assessment inquiry. Threat assessment
investigators may consult with colleagues and with professionals in other fields and
disciplines who possess special skills and experience in handling situations involving
potential targeted violence. These professionals may include other law enforcement
officers, mental health service providers, social workers, physicians, and others
knowledgeable about stalking, domestic violence, and workplace violence. The
knowledge, experience, and insights of these professionals may help the threat
assessment investigator in evaluating and organizing information concerning
situations that involve the threat of targeted school violence.
In addition, as investigators proceed with a threat assessment investigation, they
continuously should ask themselves the following questions:
• Does the information collected prompt more concern or less concern about
the possibility that the student is moving on a path toward a school attack?
• What information might prompt less concern?
• What information might heighten concern?
• What options exist for intervening in the behavior of or redirecting the student
away from ideas of or plans for a school attack?
• Should potential targets be contacted, warned, and/or protected?
As with a threat assessment inquiry, it is critical that investigators document and
keep a record of the information that they gather and evaluate in carrying out a
school threat assessment investigation. A well-documented record provides baseline
information about a student’s thinking and actions at a certain point in time. This
information can be useful if the student comes to authorities’ attention again, or if at
some point in the future investigators need to determine whether the subject has
changed patterns of thinking and behavior. Also, should a threatening situation
result in civil or criminal action against a student or others, a carefully documented
investigative file will be an important asset in demonstrating that a threat assessment
investigation was conducted properly and in compliance with applicable laws,
policies, and procedures.
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C
HAPTER VI - MANAGING A THREATENING SITUATION
CHAPTER VI
MANAGING A
THREATENING
SITUATION
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HAPTER VI - MANAGING A THREATENING SITUATION
63
Threat assessment and threat management are integrated and interdependent
functions. Many students who come to the attention of threat assessment teams may
need help and support. Assisting, directing, and managing these young people and
the situations they are in should be high priorities for threat assessment team
members.
When the findings of a threat assessment inquiry or investigation suggest that a
student has the interest, motive, and ability to mount a school attack, and has started
down a path toward attack, the primary mission is to prevent the attack and protect
possible targets. Accordingly, an individual management/monitoring plan should be
developed for any student who is identified in a threat assessment inquiry or
investigation as posing a threat of targeted school violence.
Key Components and Functions of a Management Strategy
Who should manage the threatening situation, and what the components of the plan
are, will depend on the specific threatening situation. For example, a student who is
under the jurisdiction of the juvenile or criminal justice system could be supervised
or managed by court or justice system officials. If the student remains in school,
school administrators might work with parents to impose and monitor the student’s
compliance with a supervision or management plan.
Successful management of a threatening situation requires substantial time and
effort. Management of these situations comprises three related functions:
1. Controlling/containing the situation and/or student in a way that will prevent the
possibility of an attack;
2. Protecting and aiding possible targets; and
3. Providing support and guidance to help the student deal successfully with his or
her problems.
Considerations in Developing a Management Strategy
Managing Threatening Situations for the Short Term
Managing a student of concern involves short-term and longer-term considerations.
In the short term, after a threat assessment investigation has concluded that a
student poses a risk of targeted school violence, authorities must move immediately
to intervene with that student to contain the threatening situation and reduce the
potential for violence.
In some cases, subjecting t
he s
tudent to a threat assessment inquiry or investigation
may have the added effect of containing future threatening behavior. As a result of
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HREAT ASSESSMENT IN SCHOOLS GUIDE
the inquiry or investigation, the potential attacker receives help in addressing the
problems that may have prompted his or her action and abandons plans for the
attack, believing that an attack is not feasible or necessary.
In other situations, there must be more overt containment of potential attackers.
Containment and control in these situations may include supervision and/or
confinement of the student of concern and the protection of possible targets.
Managing Threatening Situations for the Long Term
Once the immediate threat of a situation is believed to be under control for the short
term, the threat assessment team should turn its attention to longer-term safety. The
threat assessment team should address two central questions: What steps should be
taken to contain a potential attacker over the longer term? What course of action
should be pursued to deter the potential attacker from posing a future threat of
violence?
The primary goal in a school threat assessment is to prevent an attack. The
intervention or management strategy selected therefore should be the one with the
greatest potential for long-term
preventive power.
Threat managers should ask: "What will be the most effective and least damaging
course of action?" When confronted with a problem, professionals often choose the
tools with which they are most familiar: Police officers arrest; mental health
professionals commit; workplace managers fire; principals suspend or expel.
Caution should be used in a given situation of concern to make sure that the
response of authorities is appropriate to the problem.
The most familiar response may or
may not be the best response, the
best course of action for the longer
term. For example, school
administrators may feel pressured to
"get tough" or "set an example" by
suspending or expelling a student
who threatens to bring a weapon to
school. However, suspension or
expulsion of a student can create the
risk of triggering either an
immediate or a delayed violent
response unless such actions are
coupled with containment and
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65
support. A student who is expelled may conclude: "I have lost everything. I have only
a short time to act. I will give them what they deserve." Acting upon those beliefs,
the student may return to school with weapons and attack others. In addition, a
student who is suspended or expelled without alternative educational placement may
be under less supervision than if he or she were to remain in a school setting.
Those with responsibility to manage a student assessed as posing a threat of targeted
violence should consider options for the long-term management of threatening
situations in the context of the primary goal of prevention. The response with the
greatest punitive power may or may not have the greatest preventive power.
Although arresting a student may be necessary in a particular situation, without
careful attention to the need for confinement, weapons removal, or interpersonal
intervention, that action may be insufficient to prevent an eventual attack at school
or otherwise protect a target. Similarly, referring a student to the mental health
system, without seeing that referral in the context of an overall monitoring/
management plan, may not be sufficient to prevent targeted violence.
An Integrated Systems Approach to Managing Threatening Situations
The Safe School Initiative found that school attackers’ formulation of ideas about
carrying out an attack oftentimes followed failed efforts to solve problems and reduce
emotional pain through nonviolent means. Helping a student to see that he or she
has a future, and directing that student to effective, non-violent ways to resolve
disputes and conflicts, takes sensitivity, commitment, and an integrated systems
approach to meeting the needs of that student.
An integrated systems approach can enhance the potential effectiveness of both
short- and long-term strategies for managing threatening situations. Those
responsible for managing a situation and student of concern–school officials, law
enforcement officers, mental health professionals, youth service workers, court,
probation, or correctional staff–should identify existing resources within the
community that can play roles in managing students who pose threats of targeted
school violence.
Discontinuation of Monitoring
A key focus of the threat assessment process is to connect the student to services and
support systems that provide encouragement and hope, and reduce the likelihood
that the student will engage in future threatening behavior. The ultimate objective is
to enable the student to function without monitoring by responsible adult authorities.
Monitoring of a student may be discontinued after responsible authorities have
completed the following tasks:
Those with responsibility to manage a
student assessed as posing a threat of
targeted violence should consider options
for the long-term management of
threatening situations in the context of the
primary goal of prevention. The response
with the greatest punitive power may or
may not have the greatest preventive
power.
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HREAT ASSESSMENT IN SCHOOLS GUIDE
• Assessing whether (and to what extent) the student has changed unacceptable
thinking and behavior over time; and
• Developing and supporting intervention strategies that encourage and help the
student to change.
After a determination is made that the subject no longer poses a threat of targeted
school violence, formal monitoring is ended. However, the student still may remain
involved with service systems within the community that will support his or her
continued successful functioning.
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HAPTER VII - ACTION PLANS FOR SCHOOL LEADERS
CHAPTER VII
ACTION PLANS
FOR SCHOOL LEADERS:
CREATING A SAFE AND
CONNECTED SCHOOL
CLIMATE AND
IMPLEMENTING A THREAT
ASSESSMENT PROGRAM
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HAPTER VII - ACTION PLANS FOR SCHOOL LEADERS
69
Creating a Safe and Connected School Climate
Creating cultures and climates of safety is essential to the prevention of violence in
schools. How can a school, its teachers and administrators, and its students work
toward implementing cultures of connection and climates of safety?
Major Components and Tasks for Creating a Safe/Connected School Climate
1. Assess the school's emotional climate.
Although no one wants to believe that this country’s educational institutions are
anything other than safe and positive environments that support the learning
experience, it is incumbent upon those in positions of responsibility to take a step
back and gain perspective on the emotional climate of their schools. This perspective
can be gained by systematically surveying students, faculty, and other important
stakeholders, such as parents, administrators, school board members, and
representatives of community groups who interact with the school about the
emotional climate of schools. Anonymous surveys, face-to-face interviews, focus
groups, and psychological measures integrated into a total assessment package all
have been used to varying degrees to gather key "real time" data. It is essential that
school administrators, parents, and community leaders not assume that they know
school climates as do those individuals–especially students–who are most directly
affected by the educational experience on a daily basis. Absent a thorough
assessment of climate process, school officials and leaders may never have the
opportunity to find out what they did not know.
The findings of climate surveys can inform efforts to plan ways to enhance safety and
respect within the educational environment. It is important to give feedback about
school climate data to all involved and affected parties. Sharing climate data
establishes a foundation for building an integrated systems approach that will bring
the central "players" to the table; empower students to make change; and connect the
school to the community and parental support.
2. Emphasize the importance of listening in schools.
Pupils must listen respectfully to adults and to their peers, and teachers,
adminis
trators, and other adults must listen respectfully to their students and to each
o
t
her
. Gr
o
wnups often expect that students listen to adults in authority. However,
all t
oo frequently adults forget that respectful listening is a two-way street. A school
with a culture of two-way listening will encourage and empower students to have the
cour
ag
e t
o br
eak t
he ingrained code of silence.
Listening also must be expanded beyond academic concerns. Communications
between teachers and students also should include listening to feelings, especially
t
hose of hur
t and pain. In addition, it is im
por
t
ant to "listen" to behaviors. Many
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students, including some who consider violence an appropriate way to solve
problems, have a difficult time finding the words to articulate the
disenfranchisement, hurt, or fear that they may feel. Not knowing how to express
their problems and feelings may prompt these students to take action. Adults who
listen to behavior and assist students in learning how to articulate their feelings and
experiences provide students with critical skills that can contribute to preventing and
reducing violence.
3. Take a strong, but caring stance against the code of silence.
Silence leaves hurt unexposed and unacknowledged. Silence may encourage a young
person to move along a path to violence.
4. Work actively to change the perception that talking to an adult about a student
contemplating violence is considered snitching.
A school climate in which students connect to each other and to adults is one that
promotes a safe and secure educational environment. A student who finds the
courage to tell a caring adult about a friend in pain may save a life.
5. Find ways to stop bullying.
Bullying is a continuum of abuse, ranging from verbal taunts to physical threats to
dangerous acts.
22
Bullying is not playful behavior. In bullying, one student assumes
power by word or deed over another in a mean-spirited and/or harmful manner. In a
school with a culture of safety and connection, both the bully and the student who is
the victim of the bullying are attended to in a respectful manner. Schools with
climates of safety and respect are establishing foundations for pro-social behavior.
These climates teach conflict resolution, peer mediation, active listening, and other
non-violent ways to solve problems. In a safe school climate, adults do not bully
students and do not bully each other - and they do not turn a blind eye to bullying
behavior when they know that it is going on in the school.
6. Empower students by involving them in planning, creating, and sustaining a school
culture of safety and respect.
Creating a safe school climate is a process that should involve all members of the
school community, including teachers, students, parents, counselors, administrators,
health s
t
aff, security professionals, and support personnel. Climates of safety should
be collaborative ones. Helping students to engage in positive, productive activities or
w
or
k in t
heir local community can diminish isolation and enhance connection and
saf
e
ty
.
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7. Ensure that every student feels that he or she has a trusting relationship with at least
one adult at school.
Trusting relationships between adults and students are the products of quality
connection, interaction, and communications. These relationships evolve and do not
develop simply because an adult, such as a homeroom teacher or a guidance
counselor, and a student have been ordered or assigned to interact with one another.
Schools with cultures and climates of safety monitor students on a regular basis.
School administrators should take steps to ensure that at least one adult at school
knows what is happening with each student.
8. Create mechanisms for developing and sustaining safe school climates.
A mechanism for developing and sustaining safe school climates should serve as a
vehicle for planning and monitoring the climate and culture of the school. This
mechanism may involve administrators, teachers, counselors, students, school law
enforcement and security staff, and other personnel. Questions to be considered in
implementing this mechanism might include: What should be done to develop and
support climates of safety? To what extent are teachers, administrators, and other
school staff encouraged to focus on students’ social/emotional learning needs? How
close is the school to achieving the goal of ensuring that every student feels that there
is an adult to whom he or she can turn for talk, support, and advice if things get
tough?
9. Be aware of physical environments and their effects on creating comfort zones.
Building structure, facility safety plans, lighting, space, and architecture, among other
physical attributes of educational institutions, all can contribute to whether a school
environment feels, or is in fact, safe or unsafe. In large schools, school
administrators may wish to explore changes in the physical characteristics of the
school that would permit the assignment of teachers and students to smaller,
mutually intersecting and supportive groupings within the broader educational
community.
10. Emphasize an integrated systems model.
People support most what they believe they have had genuine input in creating. This
requires the difficult but necessary task of bringing all of the stakeholders to the
table. Stakeholders include: students, teachers, administrators, school board
members, parents, law enforcement personnel, after-school and community-based
groups, and others. Stakeholders must struggle with questions such as the definition
of "fairness," "threat," "consequence," and "change" as these concepts fit into the
unique context of each school, school system, and the surrounding community.
22
For more detailed references on bullying, please refer to the Appendix.
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11. All climates of safety ultimately are "local."
Many local factors contribute to the creation of a culture and climate of safety. These
factors include: the leadership–"open-door"-role of the school principal; empowered
buy-in of student groups; connections to the local community and its leaders; and the
respectful integration into the safe school climates process of "safekeepers," such as
parents and law enforcement personnel close to the school.
Schools that have succeeded in creating safe school climates have done so because of
their recognition that such climates of safety actually raise the bar on sound
educational expectations, which, in turn, keep students engaged and learning at high
levels. Such schools achieve their aims by realizing that safe school climates are not
created overnight. Implementation of the safe school climates process requires
planning and dedicated work. Participants in this process need adequate feedback
and evaluative processes to sustain and continually improve educational
environments. To work effectively, safe school climates that create relationships of
respect and connection between adults and students must be accepted as integral to
the mission of threat assessment and management, and understood from the top
down as integral to the success of the learning experience.
Implementing a Threat Assessment Program
Threat assessment policies and programs work best as components of school
violence prevention strategies if these policies and programs are authorized,
developed, and implemented by local officials, and developed in consultation with
representatives of the broader community. The following course of action should be
pursued in establishing a threat assessment approach in a community or school
district.
1. A principal, superintendent, school board member, or other school official
initiates a request to develop a process to evaluate and respond to threatening
situations. The request is forwarded to the school board or other responsible
oversight entity for policy approval.
Threatening situations might include: threats made directly against students,
teachers, or other school officials; threats made indirectly by telephone, in writing,
over the Internet, or through interpersonal contacts; communications or behaviors
suggesting a student’s intent to mount an attack at school; and allegations of bomb-
making or t
hat a student possesses a firearm.
2. The sc
hool dis
tr
ict cr
eat
es a planning team to develop or further refine a process
t
o identify
, assess, and manag
e threatening situations.
Members of the team should be drawn from the school district and the community.
T
eam member
s should include r
epr
esent
atives of law enforcement and mental health
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C
HAPTER VII - ACTION PLANS FOR SCHOOL LEADERS
73
agencies who work with the schools. Representatives from the school district should
include administrators, teachers, attorneys, school security officials, and school
psychologists and mental health workers.
The team appointed to develop a process to evaluate threatening situations should
determine the status of each of the following:
•
Information-sharing: What are the existing policies, procedures, and legal
parameters in place for access to and sharing of school, law enforcement, and
mental health records? The team should ascertain what information
concerning students is available; where that information is located; how and
under what conditions that information can be accessed; and who can access
available information.
•
Existing policies regarding threats and threatening situations: The team should
review all existing school disciplinary policies, including those related to
threats and threatening situations. This review should cover definition of
threats and threatening situations and sanctions for engaging in threatening
behavior. The team should assess the effectiveness of existing school discipline
policies in this area.
•
Existing policies regarding the roles and responsibilities of law enforcement: The
team should review policies that cover when police are to be contacted by the
school; what options are available to police officials for intervening in a
situation once they are contacted; and interaction of the police and local
school officials, such as principals, in responding to and managing threatening
situations.
•
Existing approaches to creating and maintaining safe and respectful school
climates and cultures: The team should engage in an assessment of the
emotional climate of the school. This assessment should include a review of
policies; rules and regulations; and physical aspects of the school that may
affect the overall safety and security of the educational institution.
3. The planning team should determine what policies, rules, regulations, procedures,
and/or processes should be revised or created. Some schools already may have
policies and protocols in place to deal with certain kinds of threats and threatening
behaviors, such as e-mail threats, internet threats, potential suicides, and other
behaviors that raise concern about potential violence. In particular, the planning
team’s deliberations in this area should produce answers to the following questions:
• What should be the roles and responsibilities of school administrators,
teachers, security personnel, and other school officials in responding to threats
and t
hr
eatening situations? When should parents be contacted concerning a
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HREAT ASSESSMENT IN SCHOOLS GUIDE
threatening situation? Which situations should be handled within the school?
Which situations require notification of, and intervention by, law enforcement
officials?
• What should be the roles/responsibilities of law enforcement officials in
responding to threats and threatening situations in schools?
• Under what conditions will information concerning a student or a threatening
situation be shared? What types of information will be shared? With whom
will it be shared?
• When should students who engage in threatening behavior be referred to
outside services, such as mental health agencies, for assistance? How should
referrals to outside agencies be handled?
• What actions should be taken to develop and support climates of safety within
the educational institution? What steps could be taken by school officials to
encourage students to come forward with concerns about potentially violent
situations? What policies or actions would encourage students to bring their
problems to the attention of adults? How can school officials and other adults
work with students to resolve problems and remedy underlying conditions?
4. School administrators, teachers, law enforcement officials, parents,
representatives of other community agencies and organizations, and representatives
of the student body, where appropriate, review and provide feedback on revised
and/or new recommended processes for threat assessment. These processes should
include recommendations for implementation, training, and the periodic review,
evaluation, and updating of the threat assessment program.
5. The school board reviews and acts upon recommended changes and additions to
the threat assessment program.
6. Upon approval by the school board or other appropriate authorities, school
officials will implement the threat assessment process.
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C
HAPTER VIII - CONCLUSION
CHAPTER VIII
CONCLUSION:
THREAT ASSESSMENT AS
A DECISION-MAKING
TOOL
C
HAPTER VIII - CONCLUSION
77
Developing a strategy to prevent and respond to potential incidents of targeted
school violence is a challenging and complex task. There is no single, universal
prescription that will be effective in dealing with every situation or crisis that will
confront school administrators, law enforcement officials, parents, and other
individuals and organizations in the community.
When a student’s behavior raises the specter of potential violence, responsible adults
will be forced to make judgments about the risk associated with that student’s actions
and how to respond to that threatening situation. The threat assessment process
outlined in this
Guide will not eliminate the need to make difficult judgments when
the actions of an individual suggest that the safety and security of a school is at risk.
Instead, the Guide is intended to assist officials in implementing a process that will
inform these judgments and increase the likelihood that actions based upon these
judgments will prevent incidents of targeted violence in schools.
The threat assessment process is rooted in the proposition that each situation of
concern should be viewed and assessed individually and that targeted violence is the
end result of a discernible process. No two cases involving the potential for targeted
school violence are likely to be similar in all aspects. Application of that process is
guided by the facts of that situation and carried out through the analysis of
information about behaviors and situational references. Instead of basing judgments
of risk on student traits or whether that student made specific threatening
statements, the threat assessment process focuses upon evaluating that student’s
behaviors and communications and determining whether those behaviors and
communications suggest that the student has the intent and capacity to carry out a
school attack.
The work of the Secret Service and the Department of Education in examining the
problem of targeted school violence suggests that the threat assessment process can
help to develop and maintain key relationships between the school and the
community. These relationships are critical elements in creating safe school climates.
Schools and communities that think clearly about threat assessment and management
will develop relationships, processes, and protocols that will contribute to reducing
school violence and to creating safe and secure learning environments in this nation’s
schools.
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78
A
PPENDIX
Appendix
ANNOTATED
RESOURCES
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81
The following section offers suggestions for further reading on specific topics related
to responding to threatening situations in schools and to creating safe school
climates. Each topic area is accompanied by a brief description of the documents
listed within that topic. The list that follows is not intended to be exhaustive or all-
inclusive. Instead, the list is offered as a starting point for additional reading in
selected areas.
Bullying and the Creation of Respectful Climates
The following resources provide specific information on bullying behavior and more
general information on the experiences of boys and young men in school and in
society. The work by Olweus and related work by Graham and Juvonen review
bullying behavior in schools. Olweus pioneered research on bullying behavior and
provides an overview of decades of research on this topic. "Bullying behavior among
U.S. youth" provides recent data on the prevalence of bullying behavior in America.
The three books by William Pollack and his colleagues describe Pollack’s work
talking with boys and young men about their experiences in school and in the
community.
Real boys and Real boys’ voices include findings from Pollack’s work on
the culture of boyhood in America; review certain assumptions that parents and
other adults may bring to their interactions with boys and young men; and include
suggested approaches and strategies for improving relationships with boys and young
men.
Real boys workbook contains specific exercises for parents and teachers to help
enhance their interactions and communications with boys and young men. Olweus
and colleagues’ and Pollack and colleagues’ work encourages parents, school leaders,
and others to work to create respectful and safe school climates.
• Graham, S, & Juvonen, J. (2001). An Attributional Approach to Peer
Victimization. In Juvonen, J. Graham, S. (eds.),
Peer Harassment in School:
The Plight of the Vulnerable and Victimized, pp. 49-72
. New York: Guilford
Press.
• Olweus, D. (1993).
Bullying at School: What we know and what we can do.
New York: Blackwell.
• Olweus, D. (1996, Spring). Bully/Victim Problems at School: Facts and
Effective Intervention.
Reclaiming Children and Youth, pp. 15-22.
• N
ansel, T., Overpeck, M., Pilla, R., Ruan, J., Simons-Morton, B., & Scheidt, P.
(200
1). Bull
ying behavior among U.S. y
outh.
Jour
nal of t
he American Medical
Association, 285
, pp. 2094-2100.
• P
ollack
, W
. (1
998).
R
eal bo
y
s: R
escuing our sons fr
om the myths of boyhood
.
New York: Henry Holt, Inc.
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HREAT ASSESSMENT IN SCHOOLS GUIDE
• Pollack, W., & Cushman, K. (2001). Real boys workbook. New York: Villard.
• Pollack, W., & Shuster, T. (2000).
Real boys’ voices. New York: Random
House.
Information-Sharing / Legal Issues
These resources provide an overview of the issues impacting the sharing of
information about students in schools.
Sharing information is a primer on the Family
Educational Rights and Privacy Act (FERPA), the federal regulation governing
protection of educational records and other student information in schools. It
includes the full text of FERPA, as well as detailed explanations on exceptions to
FERPA restrictions. "Establishing and maintaining interagency information sharing"
provides guidance on developing and implementing appropriate policies to permit or
facilitate sharing of information about juveniles across agencies.
School violence:
Sharing student information provides further information on the protections afforded
to student information and reviews recent state legislative initiatives designed to
make sharing information about students easier to accomplish.
• Medaris, M.L., Campbell, E., & James, B. (1997, June).
Sharing information: A
guide to the Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act and participation in
juvenile justice programs. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Justice,
Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention and U.S. Department of
Education, Family Policy Compliance Office.
Please also see the following Web site for updates on FERPA regulations since the
1997 publication of this document:
http://www.ed.gov/offices/OM/fpco
• Slayton, J. (2000, March). Establishing and maintaining interagency
information sharing.
JAIBG Bulletin. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of
Justice, Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention.
• Thomerson, J. (2001, May).
School violence: Sharing student information.
Denver, Colo.: National Conference of State Legislatures.
Sc
hool Violence and Crime
As of the publication date of this Guide, the resources included below represent
some of t
he mos
t r
ecent dat
a and s
t
atis
tics on violence, cr
ime, and other behavior in
Amer
ican schools as w
ell as in t
he community
. Since currently there is no one
centr
al mechanism f
or reporting violence and crime perpetrated and experienced by
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83
youths in American schools, these reports collectively represent a fairly
comprehensive picture of school violence and crime in America.
• Anderson, M., et. al. (2001). School-associated violent deaths in the United
States, 1994-1999.
Journal of the American Medical Association, 286, pp.
2695-2702 (2001).
• Kaufman, P., et. al.
Indicators of School Crime and Safety, 2000. U. S.
Department of Education (NCES 2001-017) and U. S. Department of Justice
(NCJ-184176): Washington, D.C. (2000). Available at:
http://nces.ed.gov/pubs2001/quarterly/winter/elementary/e_section4.html.
• National Research Council and Institute of Medicine, Committee on Law and
Justice and Board on Children, Youth, and Families. (2001).
Juvenile Crime,
Juvenile Justice
. Panel on Juvenile Crime: Prevention, Treatment, and Control.
McCord, J., et. al. (Eds.). National Academy Press: Washington, D.C.
• Snyder, H.N., & Sickmund, M. (1999).
Juvenile offenders and victims: 1999
National Report
. Washington, D.C.: Office of Juvenile Justice & Delinquency
Prevention, U.S. Department of Justice. Available at:
http://www.ncjrs.org/html/ojjdp/nationalreport99/index.html.
• U.S. Department of Education, National Center for Education Statistics
(2002).
Digest of Education Statistics 2000; Washington D.C.: Authors.
• U.S. Department of Education and U.S. Department of Justice (1999).
1999
Annual Report on School Safety. Washington, D.C.: Authors.
Risk Assessment and General Aggression / Violence
"Assessing violence risk among youth" presents an overview of the known risk factors
for general aggression and violence among youth. It summarizes the current
scientific knowledge base on the topic and includes recommendations for clinicians
tasked with assessing the risk of general aggression and violence (i.e. not targeted
violence) in youth.
Manual for the SAVRY presents a similar review of risk factors for
general aggression and violence in youth and provides specific guidance and a
structured assessment tool to help guide clinicians’ assessment of risk for general
aggression and violence within a particular individual (youth).
• Borum, R. (2000). Assessing violence risk among youth.
Journal of Clinical
Psy
c
hology
, 56
, pp. 1
263-1
288.
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HREAT ASSESSMENT IN SCHOOLS GUIDE
• Borum, R., Bartel, P., & Forth, A. (2002). Manual for the Structured
Assessment of Violence Risk in Youth (SAVRY)
. Tampa: Fla.: University of
South Florida.
• U.S. Department of Health and Human Services. (2001).
Youth violence: A
report of the Surgeon General
. Rockville, Md.: U.S. Department of Health and
Human Services, Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services
Administration, Center for Mental Health Services, National Institutes of
Health, National Institute of Mental Health. Available at:
http://www.surgeongeneral.gov/library/youthviolence.
Threat Assessment and Targeted Violence
The following documents represent a sample of information currently available on
various types of targeted violence and on threat assessment as a strategy to help
prevent targeted attacks. "Defining an approach for evaluating targeted violence" is
an academic paper that presents the general concepts of threat assessment and 10
key questions that investigators and others can use when gathering information about
someone who may pose a threat of targeted violence. "Assassination in the United
States" is also an academic paper that reviews the Exceptional Case Study Project
and presents the study’s findings.
Protective intelligence & threat assessment
investigations
is a guide for state and local law enforcement officials and others with
protective responsibilities. It sets forth guidelines for developing a threat assessment
capacity for targeted violence against protected officials and others in a manner
similar to that contained in this
Guide. It also includes findings from the Exceptional
Case Study Project. "Threat assessment" provides a brief and straightforward
description of the threat assessment approach. "Evaluating risk for targeted violence
in schools" presents and compares the various assessment approaches schools
currently have available for gauging the threat that a particular student may pose.
The paper reviews profiling, structured clinical assessment, automated decision-
making (e.g., the use of software or Web-based decision tools), and threat
assessment.
• Defining an approach for evaluating risk of targeted violence.
Behavioral
Sciences & the Law
, 17, pp. 323-337. Available at
http://www.secretservice.gov/ntac.htm.
• Fein, R.A., & Vossekuil, B.V. (1999). Assassination in the United States: An
operational study of recent assassins, attackers, and near-lethal approachers.
Journal of Forensic Sciences, 44, pp. 321-333. Available at
http://www.secretservice.gov/ntac.htm.
• Fein, R.A., & Vossekuil, B. (1998).
Protective intelligence & threat assessment
in
v
estigations: A guide for state and local law enforcement officials
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(NIJ/OJP/DOJ Publication No. 170612). Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department
of Justice. Available at http://www.secretservice.gov/ntac.htm.
• Fein, R.A., Vossekuil, B., & Holden, G.A. (1995, September). Threat
assessment: An approach to prevent targeted violence.
National Institute of
Justice: Research in Action
, 1-7. Available at
http://www.secretservice.gov/ntac.htm.
• Reddy, M., Borum, R., Berglund, J., Vossekuil, B., Fein, R., & Modzeleski, W.
(2001). Evaluating risk for targeted violence in schools: Comparing risk
assessment, threat assessment, and other approaches.
Psychology in the
Schools, 38, pp. 157-172. Available at http://www.secretservice.gov/ntac.htm.
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HREAT ASSESSMENT IN SCHOOLS GUIDE
Web Sites
United States Department of Education
. . . . .www.ed.gov
United States Secret Service . . . . . . . . . . . . . .www.secretservice.gov
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Author Brief Bios
Robert A. Fein, Ph.D.
Robert Fein is a forensic psychologist who is a director of the National Violence
Prevention and Study Center. Dr. Fein has worked with the U.S. Secret Service for
the last 20 years in the area of threat assessment. Recently, he has served as co-
director of the Secret Service
Safe School Initiative. Together with Bryan Vossekuil,
Dr. Fein is author of
Protective Intelligence and Threat Assessment: A Guide for State
and Local Law Enforcement Officials and of other publications concerning targeted
violence. He holds appointments at Harvard Medical School and the University of
Massachusetts Medical School. Dr. Fein can be reached at [email protected].
Bryan Vossekuil
Bryan Vossekuil is a director of the National Violence Prevention and Study Center.
He retired as a special agent from the U.S. Secret Service, where he served as
executive director of the National Threat Assessment Center. He also served as co-
director of both the Secret Service's
Safe School Initiative and Exceptional Case
Study Project. He has a special interest in the assessment and management of
threatening persons and situations and has co-authored a number of publications on
threat assessment. He can be reached at [email protected].
William S. Pollack, Ph.D.
William Pollack is Director of the Centers for Men and Young Men at McLean
Hospital in Belmont, Mass. Dr. Pollack is Assistant Clinical Professor in the
Department of Psychiatry at Harvard Medical School and is a director of the
National Violence Prevention and Study Center, as well as founder and director of
the REAL BOYS(R) Educational Programs. He has served on the U.S. Presidential
Initiative, and the National Campaign Against Youth Violence and is a consultant to
the United States Secret Service, including its collaborative
Safe School Initiative with
the U.S. Department of Education. The author of three popular books re-framing
the roles of boys in the family: Real Boys, Real Boys' Voices and the Real Boys
Workbook
, his work has also focused on the roles of violence and depression in
American society, the impact of emotional cognition/roles within organizations--most
especially in creating "safe climates" in schools and the workplace, and male-female
relationships. He may be reached at [email protected].
Randy Borum, Psy.D.
Randy Borum is Associate Professor in the Department of Mental Health
Law & Policy at University of South Florida. Dr. Borum is a licensed psychologist
and is Boar
d-Cer
tified (ABPP) and fellowship-trained in Forensic Psychology. He has
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HREAT ASSESSMENT IN SCHOOLS GUIDE
served as a sworn police officer for municipal departments in Maryland and Florida,
and is currently a consultant to the U.S. Secret Service National Threat Assessment
Center, where he worked on the
Safe School Initiative, and Advisory Board Member
for the FBI's Behavioral Science Unit.
William Modzeleski
Bill Modzeleski currently serves as the associate deputy under secretary of the Office
of Safe and Drug-Free Schools at the U.S. Department of Education. Mr. Modzeleski
has over 30 years of experience working on issues related to the care and well-being
of youth. He has served in several capacities at the U.S. Department of Justice and at
the local level. President Bush recently named Mr. Modzeleski as a Meritorious
Executive for his work in the area of school safety.
Marisa Reddy, Ph.D.
Marisa Reddy is the chief research psychologist and research coordinator
for the U.S. Secret Service National Threat Assessment Center. Dr. Reddy oversees
all research conducted by the U.S. Secret Service on targeted violence and threat
assessment, and serves as co-director of the
Safe School Initiative. Dr. Reddy is co-
author of "Evaluating Risk for Targeted Violence in Schools: Comparing Risk
Assessment, Threat Assessment, and Other Approaches," as well as additional
publications on the prevention of various types of targeted violence. She can be
reached at ntac@secretservice.gov.
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U.S. Department of Education
Rod Paige
Secretary
Office of Safe and Drug-Free Schools
Deborah Price
Deputy Under Secretary
William Modzeleski
Associate Deputy Under Secretary
U.S. Secret Service
W. Ralph Basham
Director
Office of Protective Research
Michael Stenger
Assistant Director
National Threat Assessment Center
Matthew Doherty
Special Agent in Charge
First printed in May 2002. Revised in July 2004.
This report is in the public domain. Authorization to reproduce it in whole or in
part is granted. While permission to reprint this publication is not necessary, the
citation should be: Fein, R., Vossekuil, B., Pollack, W., Borum, R., Modzeleski, W., &
Reddy, M.
Threat Assessment in Schools: A Guide to Managing Threatening Situations
and to Creating Safe School Climates. U.S. Department of Education, Office of
Elementary and Secondary Education, Safe and Drug-Free Schools Program and U.S.
Secret Service, National Threat Assessment Center, Washington, D.C., 2004.
To order copies of this report,
write to:
ED Pubs, Education Publications Center, U.S. Department of Education,
P.O. Box 1398, Jessup, MD 20794-1398;
or
fax your request to: (301) 470-1244;
or
email your request to: [email protected]v or ntac@secretservice.gov;
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HREAT ASSESSMENT IN SCHOOLS GUIDE
or call in your request toll-free: 1-877-433-7827 (1-800-4-ED-Pubs). If 877 service is
not yet available in your area, call 1-800-872-5327 (1-800-USA-LEARN). Those who
use a telecommunications device for the deaf (TDD) or a teletypewriter (TTY),
should call 1-877-576-7734.
or
order online at: www.edpubs.org
This report is also available on the Department of Education’s Web site at:
www.ed.gov/offices/OESE/SDFS and the U.S. Secret Service Web site at:
www.secretservice.gov/ntac.
On request, this publication is available in alternative formats, such as Braille, large
print, or computer diskette. For more information, please contact the Department of
Education’s Alternate Format Center (202) 260-9895 or (202) 205-8113.
90
