Chapter I
I-6 JP 3-22
multinational partners will necessarily make a military contribution, as some, for example,
may be more inclined to support development of social or economic institutions. US
military support to FID helps the HN to anticipate, preclude, and counter internal threats
while simultaneously addressing the drivers and root causes of instability. Emphasis on
internal developmental programs, as well as internal defense programs and operations, is
essential when organizing, planning, and executing military support to US FID activities.
FID includes three categories: indirect support (training foreign security forces [FSF]),
direct support (e.g., intelligence cooperation, logistic support, and CMO), and US combat
operations, all of which will be discussed in more detail in Chapter VI, “Operations.”
(1) In support of defense strategy and policy priorities, including combatant
command (CCMD) campaign plans, defense institution building is conducted to promote
principles vital to the establishment of defense institutions that are effective, accountable,
transparent, and responsive to national political systems, especially regarding good
governance, oversight of security forces, respect for human rights, and the rule of law.
(2) Success in providing internal security would allow for increasing
development opportunities. Military engagement and SC activities used for routine
shaping under a global campaign plan, CCDR’s CCPs, functional plans for competition
below the threshold of armed conflict, or a contingency plan may coincide with HN
development assistance in a FID program. These efforts may persist throughout the range
of military operations but can have significant impact during early shaping of the OE in
designated countries or the region. However, if an emerging internal threat presents
increased instability and risk, it may require increased activities in the form of a more
robust FID effort. This may trigger a transition to the deter phase of an operation.
(3) If that internal threat grows despite the ongoing US-HN FID effort, and
significant escalation in size or complexity of the FID operation is required, it would
likely be reflected in the transition to subsequent campaign phases of a limited
contingency operation or a major operation. Such a transition could include not only
more aggressive indirect support and direct support categories of FID but it may also
necessitate the third category of FID, US combat operations. For example, that level
of FID involvement could include US forces conducting COIN operations or other
security operations for, or combined with, FSF. When conducting operations alongside
a PN, this type of involvement transitions from FID to support to multinational
operations. Support to multinational operations can take many forms and may include
SFA (e.g., combat advising).
d. A FID program can also support other activities like counterterrorism (CT),
counterdrug (CD), countering some other large or transregional extremist movement or
criminal enterprise rather than COIN, or countering threat networks (CTN). Although most
of the FID programs may remain focused on COIN, in a complex and rapidly changing
security environment, US FID planners should anticipate threats to an HN’s internal
stability. These threats may include civil disorder; criminal gangs; and activities, to include
illicit drug, arms, or human trafficking; terrorism; radicalization; and resource competition
among ethnic groups. While these threats may feed a growing insurgency, they may also
become predominant as traditional power centers shift, suppressed cultural and ethnic