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Conclusion
The October 19, 2020, statement on Hunter Biden’s laptop signed by 51 former senior
intelligence community officials served to interfere in the American electoral system in the final
weeks before the 2020 presidential election. The highest officials within the CIA were aware of
the statement prior to its publication. Signatories of the statement—including lead architect,
former Acting CIA Director Michael Morell, and former CIA Inspector General David
Buckley—were on active contract with the CIA at the time the statement was drafted, reviewed,
and ultimately published. This revelation raises the concern that these officials abused the access
of their positions to curate, promote, and receive expedited approval of the statement. Indeed, the
PCRB continuously requested quick decisions from officials within the CIA and partners at
ODNI about the status of publication of the statement. This occurred after Morell specifically
requested an expedited review process and during a time when he had contracting status and was
under consideration to be named President Biden’s CIA Director.
The signatories’ choice to leverage the authority of their former intelligence community
titles to peddle a narrative about foreign election interference inappropriately embroiled the
Agency in the domestic political process. The poor judgment displayed by the signatories and the
CIA’s executive suite—those who could have prevented the Agency from being entangled in a
false and domestically politicized narrative of Russian interference—is as relevant today as it
was four years ago. To date, there are no clear or transparent rules to prevent intelligence
contractors from leveraging their access to the CIA for political purposes.
Seasoned CIA officials like Morell and Polymeropoulos were able to subvert the process
to spread disinformation in the weeks leading up to the 2020 presidential election because the
CIA lacked meaningful safeguards to prevent this from happening. Unless and until the CIA
makes substantial reforms to its own oversight processes surrounding public statements and
contractor behavior, these problems could persist.
Without rigorous oversight of the intelligence community—and without proper
safeguards to prevent the weaponization of privileged access within the intelligence
community—rogue actors like Morell and Polymeropoulos are likely to continue engaging in
political work under the guise of responsible action. As a result, the Committees will continue
oversight to prevent individuals from using the authority of the federal government for their own
partisan desires.